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I.

INTRODUCTION

N 1982, Pennsylvania embarked on an ambitious program to
channel and control the discretion of sentencing judges in the
Commonwealth. In a novel and far-reaching plan, the state instituted sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing.' The guidelines, which apply to all
felonies and misdemeanors committed on or after July 22, 1982,
are the most comprehensive endeavor in modern Pennsylvania
history to regulate the decisions of sentencing judges, whose discretion had gone virtually unfettered by either the legislature or
the appellate courts for much of this century.
In the very same year in which the guidelines went into effect,
the General Assembly passed aggressive new legislation prescribing stiff mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for a variety
of repeat and violent offenses. 2 These statutes partially or completely remove judicial discretion from sentencing decisions for
limited categories of crimes.
As implemented, the guidelines and mandatory-minimum
t President Judge, Superior Court of Pennsylvania. B.A. Villanova University, 1951; LL.B. Temple University School of Law, 1955, converted to J.D.,
1969.
1. The guidelines are published at 204 PA. CODE §§ 303.1-.9 (1986). For a
discussion of the process of their adoption, see infra notes 21 & 52.
2. See 42 PA. C.S. §§ 9712-9718; 75 PA. C.S. §§ 3731(e), 3735.

(1309)
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sentencing acts together will increase sentence severity in Pennsylvania for most crimes across the board. The new laws thus reflect a public perception that sentencing judges have been far too
lenient, even guilty of contributory negligence, with respect to the
incidence of crime in the Commonwealth.
The concept of sentencing guidelines, however, did not originate solely with the idea that judges were too soft on crime. The
primary support for sentencing guidelines came from those who
believed that sentencing judges simply had too much discretion,
resulting in disparate treatment of similar offenders and even random harshness in sentencing. 3 One scholar commenting on this
phenomenon ranked the prerogative of the sentencing judge
among "the greatest degree of uncontrolled power over the liberty of human beings that one can find in the legal system." 4
The theory that gained momentum in this country in the
1970's, and eventually spurred many states to adopt sentencing
reform, held that the best way to promote justice in sentencing
was to rein in the discretion of the sentencing judge. In Pennsylvania, the groundswell of negative opinion about the way
judges had exercised the sentencing power precipitated a virtual
revolution in sentencing practice and procedure. As a result, in
virtually every aspect of sentencing, the Pennsylvania courts are
under much tighter strictures today than they were only a decade
ago.
As a judge, I have listened to the criticism, but I remain
somewhat skeptical of the movement to take away judicial sentencing discretion. The focus on the judge as the root of all evil
in the sentencing process has obscured the considerable influence
exerted on sentencing decisions by a number of other players behind the scenes: prosecutors, defense attorneys, police, probation and parole officers, correctional authorities, psychoanalysts,
the victims, the public through their representatives in the legislatures, and the media all have an impact on final dispositions in
criminal cases, yet the roles of these other parties have generated
3. See Martin, Interests and Politics in Sentencing Reform: The Development of Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and Pennsylvania, 29 VILL. L. REV. 21, 26 & n. 15, 27
(1984). In a speech on the floor of the Pennsylvania legislature, the main sponsor of the bill establishing the Pennsylvania guidelines commission focused almost exclusively on sentencing disparity as creating the need for sentencing
guidelines. See 1978 Pa. House Legislative Journal 1473-75 (statements of Rep.
Scirica).
4. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904, 916 (1962), quoted in Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118,
131 n.22, 351 A.2d 650, 657 n.22 (1976).
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neither the intense debate nor the attempts to confine discretion
that presently all but engulf the sentencing judge. To blame lenient judges for the magnitude of the crime problem, moreover, is
to confuse the source of the problem with one of its byproducts.
Light sentences probably owe more to overcrowded prisons than
to any lack of resolve on the part of judges to take a tough stand
5
on crime.
More than professional esprit de corps, however, makes me
question the wisdom of removing sentencing decisions from the
hands ofjudges. Having been a prosecutor and a defense attorney before becoming a trial judge in the Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas, I have developed more than one perspective on the criminal justice system. As a judge, I was called
upon countless times to exercise the awesome responsibility of
the sentencing power. My collective experience has convinced
me that no one is in a better position than the judge to render a
judgment of sentence.
Everyone can agree that in general the courts have a duty to
dispense criminal justice with a stern but even hand. Judges know
that nothing less will suffice for the criminal sanction to be effective. What the casual observer might not appreciate, however, is
that criminal cases are among the least uniform and predictable
known to the law. The very irrationality of the criminal act translates into a less-than-rational pattern of cases. I have sat in judgment of crimes carried out with cold, premeditated brutality, and
others committed in the heat of passion where, unfortunately for
all concerned, the harm resulting was the same. I have stared
down ruthless felons who stood before me without remorse for
their deeds, and looked upon just as many penitent wrongdoers
who approached the bench hat in hand, willing to expiate their
crimes and fully deserving of the mercy of the court. What I have
found is that the human variables between different cases of the
same offense make it impossible to decree one just punishment
for all cases. 6 No matter how well-conceived the effort to stand5. Cf Dowd, The Pit and the Pendulum: CorrectionalLaw Reform from the Sixties
into the Eighties, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984) ("[O]ne cannot solve the problem
of crime by manipulating punishment .... ").
6. No less a jurist than Justice Nix, now Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, declared that "[t]he sentencing decision is the most complex
and difficult function a jurist is called upon to perform." Commonwealth v.
Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 136, 351 A.2d 650, 659 (1976) (Nix, J., dissenting). Removing sentencing decisions from the realm of judicial discretion does not
render them less complex, only less difficult. Indeed, the human complexities of
the individual case are ignored when a tribunal divorced from the case predeter-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 5 [1986], Art. 3

1312

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31 : p. 1309

ardize and control sentencing decisions from outside the courtroom, cases inevitably will arise where statistical assumptions
about offense or offender do not hold true, and where imposition
of sentence based on a preset formula would lead to injustice.
The sentencing judge, who usually will have sat as trial judge
as well, is by virtue of his position the only participant in the sentencing process who can calmly consider all appropriate factors
bearing on the offender, impartially balance the needs of the offender with those of society, and aptly fit the punishment to the
particular crime. To properly discharge this function, the judge
must have reasonable discretion, within limits set down by the
legislature, to fashion a penalty suitable to the case at hand.
This article, after initiating the reader to Pennsylvania's law
of discretionary sentencing, will briefly outline the new sentencing guidelines which have been superimposed on the system since
1982. The article will then highlight the avenues for discretion
wisely built into the guidelines for judges who find, in untypical
cases, that the range of sentences suggested by the guidelines is
not appropriate. In conclusion, I will attempt to point out some
of the virtues of maintaining a healthy amount of discretion in the
7
person faced with the sentencing decision.
mines the sentence. Standard sentences arrived at in the abstract will lessen
sentence disparity, but a just and rational sentence in any particular case will not
necessarily follow.
7. Of course, "windows" for judicial discretion in the new mandatory sentencing acts are slim or nonexistent. Unlike the guidelines, these laws react not
to general concerns about the fairness of the sentencing process but to the public's specific fears that courts are not dealing effectively with its worst crime
problems-like "the tyranny of armed felons." Commonwealth v. Wright, 508
Pa. 25, 42, 494 A.2d 354, 363 (1985) (Larsen, J., concurring), aff'd sub nom. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of
mandatory minimum five-year prison term for certain felonies committed with
firearms). One legislator, commenting in support of an unenacted bill that
would have established mandatory minimum five-year sentences for rape, robbery, and arson, stated:
A recent survey in my district indicated that 99.98 percent of the people
... favored mandatory sentences for the crimes [of rape, robbery, and
arson]. I think that it is our responsibility to be responsive to that particular interest of the people. They are tired of the judges and the lawyers talking about justice and talking about the proper treatment of
criminal defendants.... They are in favor of putting them in jail. If it
takes legislation to do that, as it apparently does, then I think we ought
to pass that legislation.
1976 Pa. House Legislative Journal 6013 (statement of Rep. Dorr).
As Part IV of this article will propose, however, a side effect of the
mandatory sentencing acts may be to replace judicial discretion in sentencing
the offender with prosecutorial discretion in charging him.
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THE PRE-GUIDELINES LEGAL CONTEXT

A.

"Indeterminate" Sentencing

Since 1911, Pennsylvania has embraced a system of "indeterminate" sentencing of criminal offenders under which the legislature sets the maximum penalties for each type of offense, and,
within those limits, the sentencing judge chooses a minimum and
a maximum term of confinement, or no confinement at all, on a
case-by-case basis." Pennsylvania's indeterminate sentencing
procedure "carries with it 'an implicit adoption of the philosophy
of individual sentencing.' " The idea of individualized sentencing, in turn, is rooted in the theory that the primary goal of criminal punishment is to rehabilitate the offender, and to restore him
to society once rehabilitation has had its effect. 10 Accordingly,
the sentencing judge in an indeterminate sentencing system has
broad discretion to impose a sentence tailored to the characteristics of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular case. The indeterminate nature of the sentence imposed also
means that the incarcerated offender probably will be released on
parole before he serves the maximum limits of his prison term.
The parole decision itself, of course, depends partly on the progress of the offender's "rehabilitation" while in prison." 1
B.

The Sentencing Code

A wave of dissatisfaction with indeterminate sentencing policies broke in the early 1970's.1 2 Critics from all points on the
political spectrum challenged both the rehabilitative theory on
8. Indeterminate sentencing became the law with the Act of June 19, 1911
(originally enacted as Act ofJune 19, 1911, No. 53, 1911 Pa. Laws 1055 (current
version at 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9721(c), 9722, 9754, 9758 & 9771 (Purdon 1982); 42
Pa. C.S.A. § 2301 (Purdon 1981); 61 P.S. §§ 302-308 & 311-313 (Purdon 1964)
(repealed 1978)); see also 61 P.S. § 331.25 (Purdon 1964) (originally enacted as
Act of August 6, 1941, No. 323, § 25, 1941 Pa. Laws 861, 870) (corresponds to
Act of June 19, 1911, § 1) (permitting court to impose probation in lieu of sentence in all but first-degree murder cases).
9. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 122, 377 A.2d 140, 143 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 130, 351
A.2d 650, 656 (1976)).
10. See Martin, supra note 3, at 22, 25-26; see also Commonwealth v. Martin,
466 Pa. 115, 129 & n.17, 351 A.2d 650, 655 & n.17 (1976) (citing Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)). The "correctional penitentiary," in fact,
originated in Pennsylvania with the Quakers. Dowd, supra note 5, at 3 & n.7.
11. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972); Martin, supra note
3, at 33 (reviewing Pennsylvania paroling practice). By contrast, with "determinate" sentencing, in which the offender receives a definite sentence fixed by statute, there is no parole.
12. Martin, supra note 3, at 22; see also Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa.
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which the policies rested and the unexplained sentencing disparity believed to result from them.' 3 Many urged a return to the
forgotten goals of criminal punishment: retribution, deterrence,
14
and incapacitation.
The Pennsylvania legislature's first response was to placate
the liberal observers of the sentencing process who merely
wanted more accountability from the sentencing courts. In 1974,
the legislature passed a new sentencing code, repealing all prior
inconsistent laws on sentencing procedure.' 5 The Code lent
structure to the trial judge's exercise of sentencing discretion,
while leaving the fundamental features of the indeterminate sentencing scheme intact.
Under the Code, the sentencing judge generally remains free
to select a sentence from among alternatives which include probation, a determination of guilt without further penalty, partial confinement, total confinement, or a fine. 16 The Code lists
nonexclusive criteria for the judge to consider in choosing from
among these alternatives.' 7 If the judge chooses a sentence of
confinement, he determines the minimum and maximum limits of
the prison term. The minimum may not exceed one half the maximum sentence imposed,' 8 while the maximum must be within the
statutory maximum for the type of offense involved.il The significance of the minimum sentence is that upon its expiration, the
115, 122-23 & n.6, 377 A.2d 140, 143-44 & n.6 (1977); Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 130-31 & nn.21-22, 351 A.2d 650, 656-57 & nn.21-22 (1976).
13. See Dowd, supra note 5, at 4-5 & nn.13-14, 7 & n.21; Martin, supra note
3, at 22-23 & nn.1-7, 26-27 & nn.15-20.
14. See generally Dowd, supra note 5, at 2-3, 4-5, 11-12.
15. See Act of Dec. 30, 1974, No. 345, 1974 Pa. Laws 1052 (current version
at 42 PA. C.S. §§ 9701-9781). For a brief informal history of the Code, see
Dowd, supra note 5, at 8-9.
The year before the Sentencing Code was enacted, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making power adopted rules of criminal procedure applicable to sentencing proceedings. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1401-1415. A
later amendment to the rules suspends some of the procedural provisions of the
Sentencing Code. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1415(g).
16. See 42 PA. C.S. §§ 9703, 9721.
17. Id. §§ 9722-9726. The particularized nature of the circumstances and
characteristics which these sections permit the judge to consider make it clear
that under the original Sentencing Code, the judge retained considerable caseby-case discretion in the selection of a penalty. But see infra n9te 21 and accompanying text.
18. 42 PA. C.S. § 9756(b); see also id. § 9755(b) (relating to partial
confinement).
19. See id. § 9756(a). In general, the Crimes Code prescribes the maximum
permissible penalties for the various grades of criminal offenses. See 18 PA. C.S.
§ 1101-1106.
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prisoner becomes eligible for parole for the remainder of his
20
term.
Aside from the statutory maximum for the offense, the Code
places no limitation on the maximum sentence a judge can select.
Consequently, the judge also has considerable discretion in determining the length of the minimum sentence. The Code does advise, as a general statement of policy, that "the sentence imposed
should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection
of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilita2
tive needs of the defendant." '
The General Assembly has carved out limited exceptions to
the rule of indeterminate sentencing. For example, the sheer
gravity of the crime of murder has prompted the legislature to
vastly curtail sentencing discretion for that offense. For certain
types of murder in Pennsylvania, the penalty is automatic life im22
prisonment, or worse.
20. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 294-95 & n.8, 328 A.2d 851,
854-55 & n.8 (1974). The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole has general power to grant paroles except where the maximum sentence is less than two
years, in which case the sentencing court itself can parole the prisoner at any
time. See 61 P.S. §§ 314, 331.17, 331.21, 331.26 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986).
21. 42 PA. C.S. § 9721(b). This language is a modification of the original
language of the Code that "the sentence imposed should call for the minimum
amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Act of
Dec. 30, 1974, No. 345, sec. 1, § 1321(b), 1974 Pa. Laws 1052, 1055 (emphasis
added), amended by Act of Nov. 26, 1978, No. 319, sec. 1, § 1321(b), 1978 Pa.
Laws 1316, 1316. Thus, the legislature in 1978 abandoned its preference for
"minimum" confinement and leaned toward endorsing whatever "confinement"
it took to protect the public, vindicate the victim and the community, and rehabilitate the defendant.
The 1978 amending act, in section 3, also created the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. Section 1 of
the Act prospectively amended the Code to require trial courts to consider
guidelines to be promulgated by the Commission and to provide written reasons
for deviations from the guidelines. Sec. 1, § 1321(b) (current version at 42 PA.
C.S. § 9721(b)). The Act further provided for enhanced appellate review of
sentences once the guidelines were adopted. Id. sec. 3, § 1386 (current version
at 42 PA. C.S. § 9781(c)).
The Act also codified the requirement of Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa.
115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977), that the sentencing court state reasons for its sentence on the record. Sec. 1, § 1321(b) (current version at 42 PA. C.S.
§ 9721(b)); see also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
Finally, section 5 of the amending act directed courts to consider an interim
sentencing guideline of four years' minimum confinement for certain repeat, violent felonies. In 1982, the legislature went even further by enacting mandatory
minimum five-year prison terms for such crimes. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
22. See 18 PA. C.S. § 1102(a) (sentence for first-degree murder shall be life
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In the 1982 amendments to the Sentencing Code, the General Assembly has taken further steps to reduce sentencing discretion with mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for certain
crimes. 2 3 The 1982 legislation responds to the hard-line critics of
indeterminate sentencing whose concerns were not answered by
the original Code; in other words, those who see long and definite
terms of confinement as the only effective way to deter, punish,
and incapacitate violent and dangerous criminals. Although sentencing under most of these acts is still "indeterminate" since
each prison sentence has a minimum and a maximum limit, in
practice the acts leave little or no room for judicial discretion,
since the judge can never sentence lower than the mandatory
24
minimum, and frequently he can sentence no higher.
imprisonment or death as determined under 42 PA. C.S. § 9711); id. § 1102(b)
(sentence for second-degree murder shall be life imprisonment); cf id. § 2704
(penalty for assault by life prisoner same as penalty for second-degree murder).
Third-degree murder is a felony of the first degree, id. § 2502(c), which means
the statutory maximum penalty is generally 20 years. However, a 1982 addition
to the Sentencing Code enhances the penalty to life imprisonment if the murderer has previously been convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter,
"notwithstanding any other ... statute to the contrary." 42 PA. C.S. § 9715(a);
see generally infra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing 1982 amendments
to the Code).
23. See 42 PA. C.S. §§ 9712-9718; 75 PA. C.S.A. §§ 3731(e) & 3735 (Purdon
Supp. 1986). In 1982, shortly before the sentencing guidelines went into effect
for all felonies and misdemeanors, the General Assembly passed mandatory
minimum five-year prison sentences for certain felonies committed with firearms
(42 PA. C.S. § 9712), certain felonies committed on public transportation (Id.
§ 9713), and certain repeat violent felonies (Id. § 9714). See also id. § 9715 (life
imprisonment for repeat third-degree murderers). Later in the year, the General Assembly followed up with mandatory minimum sentencing acts for drunk
driving (75 PA. C.S. § 3731(e)), homicide by vehicle while driving drunk (Id.
§ 3735), and certain crimes against the elderly and minors (42 PA. C.S. §§ 97179718).
24. The latter result holds true where the mandatory minimum constitutes
half the statutory maximum for the offense. For example, aggravated assault
under 18 PA. C.S. § 2702(a)(1), if committed on public transportation, begets a
mandatory five-year minimum sentence under 42 PA. C.S. § 9713(a); aggravated
assault under 18 PA. C.S. § 2702(a)(1) is a felony of the second degree under id.
§ 2702(b), with a statutory maximum prison sentence of ten years under id.
§ 1103(2); hence, five to ten years is at once the shortest and the longest prison
term the court can impose. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986)
(citing 42 PA. C.S. § 9756(b)); cf 18 PA. C.S. § 6121 (mandating consecutively
imposed sentence of "imprisonment for not less than five years" for third-degree felony of possessing armor-piercing bullets in commission of violent crime;
maximum sentence for third-degree felony seven years under § 1101(3)).
While the new acts sharply curtail judicial discretion, they do not affect the
ability of the parole board to grant parole after the mandatory minimum sentence expires. Even a prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence still has a
chance for parole. See Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 333 Pa. Super. 576, 595 &
n.2, 482 A.2d 1023, 1032-33 & n.2 (1984) (Cirillo, J., dissenting), rev'd on other
grounds, 516 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 1986). Nor, by and large, do the new acts limit the
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The 1982 amendments emphatically announce the legislature's displeasure with the sentencing leniency of the judicial
branch, and may herald a new era in which the legislature assumes an even greater role in the sentencing process. 2 5 For now,
however, crimes with mandatory penalties still make up but a
small proportion of the offenses which require judicial sentencing
decisions in Pennsylvania.2 6 For the vast majority of offenses, the
sentencing guidelines, not mandatory sentencing acts, will shape
the pattern of sentencing in the Commonwealth for the foreseeable future.
C.

Appellate Review of Sentences

Just as the General Assembly had traditionally left sentencing
decisions in the hands of trial courts, the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania were loath to intrude on this area of trial court discretion. As late as 1973, the supreme court said:
[T]he sentence imposed on a person convicted of crime
lies with one exception (where the conviction is for first
degree murder following a jury trial) within the sole discretion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed will
not be reviewed by an appellate court, unless it exceeds
the statutorily prescribed limits or is so manifestly exces27
sive as to constitute too severe a punishment.
Indeed, Justice Roberts could find "[no] cases where this Court
has reduced an appellant's sentence, except in . . .capital cases
where the death penalty was imposed." 28 The hands-off posture
of the state appellate courts was based on the view that "the trial
court is in a far better position to weigh the factors involved in
discretion of the prosecutor whether to charge or seek punishment under the
mandatory provisions.
25. Within outer limits set by the Constitution, see Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 & n.3 (1980), "[i]t is the province of the legislature to
determine the punishment imposable for criminal conduct." Commonwealth v.
Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 40, 494 A.2d 354, 361 (1985) (upholding constitutionality of
mandatory minimum five-year prison term for felonies committed with firearms), aff'd sub nom. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. 2411 (1986).
26. See Martin, supra note 3, at 91-92, 99 ("about five percent").
27. Commonwealth v. Lee, 450 Pa. 152, 156, 299 A.2d 640, 642 (1973)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 206, 275 A.2d 78, 80-81
(1971)). The Commonwealth's right to appeal too lenient a sentence was even
more limited. See Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 275 A.2d 78 (1971).
28. Commonwealth v. Lee, 450 Pa. 152, 156-57 n.4, 299 A.2d 640, 642-43
n.4 (1973) (citations omitted).
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sentencing determinations." 29

This absolute deference to trial court sentencing discretion
began to crumble at about the same time that the legislature
moved to impose more control under the Sentencing Code. Justice Roberts struck the first major blow in Commonwealth v. Martin,3o where the supreme court indicated that it would begin to

review sentences under a stricter standard. Martin dealt with consolidated appeals from the Lancaster County Court of Common
Pleas wherein the trial court had imposed uniform three- to tenyear terms of imprisonment on a number of defendants for unrelated sales of heroin. On appeal, the supreme court held that the
nature of the criminal act alone would no longer be a sufficient
basis upon which to determine the length of a sentence. The
court found that "at least two factors are crucial to such determination-the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant .... [T]he sentencing court must at least

consider these two factors in its sentencing determination. Failure to give such individual consideration requires that these
3
sentences be vacated." '
A year and a half after Martin,Justice Roberts wrote the next
major chapter in the assertion of appellate court control over sentencing: Commonwealth v. Riggins.32 Riggins was another appeal

from a drug conviction in Lancaster County. On this occasion,
the trial court had imposed a two- to five-year sentence for possession of approximately 1.9 ounces of marijuana with intent to
deliver. The supreme court vacated the sentence and remanded
for resentencing. Writing for a plurality of the court, Justice Roberts (later Chief Justice) noted almost universal criticism of the
"unlimited, unstructured and unreviewable discretion" confided
29. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 123, 377 A.2d 140, 144 (1977)
(plurality opinion); see also Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 131, 351 A.2d
650, 657 (1976). Justice Nix, dissenting in Martin, elaborated on one of these
factors:
The consideration of the criminal himself is peculiarly within the sentencing judge's domain. Only he can judge attitude and demeanor of
the defendant. Only he can judge defendant's repentance or lack of it.
Only he can appraise defendant's awareness of the seriousness of his
offense and his understanding of the affront to society .... No record,
for example, could perpetrate [sic] a scowl of resentment or blind
indifference.
Id. at 136 n.4, 351 A.2d at 659-60 n.4 (Nix, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
ex rel. Huntt v. Russell, 285 F. Supp. 765, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 774
(3rd Cir. 1969)).
30. 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976).
31. Id. at 133, 351 A.2d at 658.
32. 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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to trial courts,3 3 and fashioned a rule requiring courts to articu34
late reasons on the record for any sentence imposed.
One of the reasons offered in support of the Riggins holding

was that "[r]easoned sentencing decisions may... reduce disparity
in sentences-decreasing the number of unusually lenient as well
as unusually harsh sentences." 5 In fact, the Riggins plurality
noted that "[d]isparity in sentencing is one of the most criticized
aspects of the sentencing process. Requiring trial courts to articulate their reasons in selecting a particular sentence may substantially contribute to uniformity in sentences." 3 6 Ironically, the
year before in Martin, it had been uniform sentences imposed on
heroin dealers in Lancaster County that had sounded the death
37
knell for uncontrolled sentencing discretion.
Ultimately, however, Riggins and Martin are reconcilable in
that both reaffirmed Pennsylvania's overriding commitment to
the practice of individualized sentencing. Neither uniform nor
disparate sentences are per se valid unless the trial court considers individual circumstances and characteristics, and based
thereon states why it has chosen a particular sentence for a partic38
ular offender.
33. Id. at 123, 377 A.2d at 144.
34. Id. at 133, 377 A.2d at 149. The reasons-on-the-record requirement
has since been incorporated into the Sentencing Code (42 Pa. C.S. § 972 1(b)),
the Rules of Criminal Procedure (PA. R. CRIM. P. 1405(b)), and the sentencing
guidelines (204 PA. CODE § 303.1(h)). In Commonwealth v. Kostka, 475 Pa. 85,
379 A.2d 884 (1977), the Riggins rule received the implicit imprimatur of a majority of the supreme court, when ChiefJustice Eagen, who had concurred in the
result in Riggins, joined Justice Roberts' majority opinion in Kostha.
35. Riggins, 474 Pa. at 130-31, 377 A.2d at 148 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 131 n.22, 377 A.2d at 148 n.22.
37. The Martin court had mentioned "wide disparity in sentencing practices" as one of the evils of indeterminate sentencing, but under the circumstances the court had been more concerned with upholding the principle of
individualized sentencing than with reducing any disparity that might result
from it. Martin, 466 Pa. at 131 n.22, 132, 351 A.2d at 657 & n.22.
38. The rule has arisen from Riggis and Martin that unexplained disparity
in the sentences of codefendants sentenced by the same judge will constitute
grounds for the appellate court to vacate the heavier sentence and remand for a
statement of reasons for the disparity. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 340 Pa. Super.
155,489 A.2d 889 (1985); Commonwealth v. Velez, 329 Pa. Super. 15, 477 A.2d
879 (1984); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 473 A.2d 1103
(1984); Commonwealth v. Sinwell, 311 Pa. Super. 419, 457 A.2d 957 (1983).
Conversely, however, where differences appear on the record which justify disparity in codefendants' sentences, the appellate court will not disturb the sentence on grounds of disparity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lore, 338 Pa. Super.
42, 487 A.2d 841 (1984) (coconspirators aided prosecution in other cases), appeal denied, 338 Pa. Super. 42 (Pa. 1985); Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa.
Super. 219, 475 A.2d 765 (sentencing court gave adequate reasons for disparity), appeal denied, 327 Pa. Super. 219 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Parry, 306
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The landmark proportions of Martin and Riggins lie mainly in
Pa. Super. 390, 452 A.2d 781 (1982) (differences in culpability); Commonwealth
v. Harris, 286 Pa. Super. 601, 429 A.2d 685 (court gave sufficient reasons for
individual sentences), appeal denied, 286 Pa. Super. 601,429 A.2d 685 (Pa. 1981);
Commonwealth v. Landi, 280 Pa. Super. 134, 421 A.2d 442 (1980) (differences
in age, culpability, and criminal records); Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 273 Pa.
Super. 600, 417 A.2d 1210 (differences in records and cooperation with authorities), appeal denied, 273 Pa. Super. 600, 417 A.2d 1210 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Thurmond, 268 Pa. Super. 283, 407 A.2d 1357 (health differences),
appeal denied, 268 Pa. Super. 283, 407 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1979). The same holds
true when codefendants are sentenced by different judges. See Commonwealth
v. Griffin, 310 Pa. Super. 39, 456 A.2d 171, appealdenied, 310 Pa. Super. 39, 456
A.2d 171 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Craft, 304 Pa. Super. 494, 450 A.2d
1021 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hollerbush, 298 Pa. Super. 397, 444 A.2d 1235
(1982); Commonwealth v. Neal, 258 Pa. Super. 375, 392 A.2d 841 (1978), order
not disturbed by an equally divided court, 493 Pa. 335, 426 A.2d 576 (1981). But see
Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 311, 473 A.2d 1103, 1107 (1984)
(there should not be "great disparity" between sentences imposed on codefendants by different judges without facts warranting disparity).
Before Riggins, it had not been necessary for trial courts to give reasons for
sentencing codefendants differently; appellate courts generally left the matter to
trial court discretion. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 451 Pa. 12, 301 A.2d 675
(1973); Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 101 Pa. Super. 308 (1931). But see Commonwealth v. Andrews, 248 Pa. Super. 1, 7, 373 A.2d 459, 462 (1977) (Spaeth,
J., dissenting) ("probably nothing has corroded respect for the criminal justice
system more than judicial indulgence in unexplained widely disparate
sentences"), rev'dper curiam, 480 Pa. 484, 391 A.2d 989 (1978) (ordering Riggins
compliance); cf. Commonwealth v. Hill, 237 Pa. Super. 543, 353 A.2d 870 (1975)
(opinion by Spaeth, J.) (vacating identical sentence imposed on codefendant due
to disparity in codefendants' criminal records), appeal denied, 237 Pa. Super. xxvi,
353 A.2d 870 (Pa. 1976). Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard in Commonwealth v. Badger, 238 Pa. Super. 284, 357 A.2d 547 (1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 482 Pa. 240, 393 A.2d 642 (1978), the superior court refused to find a
legal sentence manifestly excessive even where it appeared unjust in comparison
with a sentence later imposed on a codefendant, because the court would not
use hindsight to evaluate abuse of discretion. See also Commonwealth v. Jorden,
333 Pa. Super. 291, 482 A.2d 573 (1984) (rejecting disparity argument where
Riggins claim not raised).
Because Pennsylvania relies on individual sentencing to achieve just results,
the courts generally will not look beyond the case at hand to compare sentences,
even for the same offense in the same county. See Commonwealth v. Kalson, 301
Pa. Super. 31, 446 A.2d 1320 (1982); cf. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa.
Super. 549, 423 A.2d 381 (1980) (court stated rule, but alternatively compared
other sentences in same county and found them not disparate). The only recognized exception is the death penalty. Pursuant to 42 PA. C.S. § 971 l(h)(l), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court hears automatic appeals from all death sentences
and reviews them for proportionality with sentences imposed in similar cases.
See id. § 971 l(h)(3)(iii); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 516 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1986)
(killing involving torture); Commonwealth v. Beasley, 504 Pa. 485, 475 A.2d 730
(1984) (killing of police officer); Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 504 Pa. 455, 475
A.2d 714 (killing threatening lives of others), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 ("contract" killing), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984).
Despite the primary purpose of the sentencing guidelines to reduce sentencing disparity, no such judicial comparison of sentences occurs under them.
Rather, the trial court selects each sentence from a grid based on the defendant's prior record and the gravity of the offense. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(b)
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their having introduced the principle of appellate review to Pennsylvania's indeterminate sentencing scheme. The supreme court
has imposed no further significant restraints on the general sentencing power. For the most part, the court has been content to
rely on the dictates of Martin and Riggins and the requirements of
the Sentencing Code that the sentencer consider the particular
circumstances of the case and characteristics of the offender and
39
then give reasons for the sentence imposed.
Notwithstanding the advent of appellate review, the Pennsylvania appellate courts continue to define the sentencing discretion of the trial court as broad, 40 and continue to decline
interference with the sentencing process "absent a manifest abuse
(1986). The appellate court simply determines whether the trial court has applied the guidelines correctly to that case. See 42 PA. C.S. §§ 9721(b), 9781(c),
9781(d). Appellate review under the mandatory-minimum sentencing legislation is even more straightforward. See, e.g., id. § 9712(d) ("The appellate court
shall vacate the sentence and remand for imposition of a sentence in accordance
with this section if it finds that the sentence was imposed in violation of this
section").
39. Compare, for example, Justice Roberts's opinions for the court affirming sentences for third-degree murder in Commonwealth v. Townsend, 497
Pa. 604, 443 A.2d 1139 (1982) (5 to 15 years), Commonwealth v. Green, 494 Pa.
406, 431 A.2d 918 (1981) (maximum of 10 to 20 years), Commonwealth v. Edrington, 490 Pa. 251, 416 A.2d 455 (1980) (6 to 15 years) and Commonwealth v.
Knight, 479 Pa. 209, 387 A.2d 1297 (1978) (8 to 20 years) with his opinion in
Commonwealth v. Butch, 487 Pa. 30, 407 A.2d 1302 (1979), overturning a sentence of five and one-half to ten months in jail for delivery of approximately an
ounce of marijuana. But see Commonwealth v. Alicea, 498 Pa. 575, 449 A.2d
1381 (1982) (sentencing court erred in using false notice of alibi defense to enhance sentence); Commonwealth v. Cottle, 493 Pa. 377, 426 A.2d 598 (1981)
(court impermissibly disregarded Sentencing Code in revoking probation and
imposing maximum sentence for defendant's failure to report to probation department); Commonwealth v. Knighton, 490 Pa. 16, 415 A.2d 9 (1980) (Roberts,
J., for a unanimous court) (sentencing court erred in failing to afford defendant
right to speak under PA. R. CRIM. P. 1405(a)).
40. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 494 Pa. 406, 410, 431 A.2d 918, 920
(1981) (quoting Martin, 466 Pa. at 130, 351 A.2d at 656); Commonwealth v.
White, 341 Pa. Super. 261, 270, 491 A.2d 252, 257 (1985); Commonwealth v.
Lore, 338 Pa. Super. 42, 70, 487 A.2d 841, 856 (1984) (citing Martin), appeal
denied, 338 Pa. Super. 42 (Pa. 1985); Commonwealth v. Anwyll, 333 Pa. Super.
453, 457, 482 A.2d 656, 657 (1984); Commonwealth v. Martin, 328 Pa. Super.
498, 501,477 A.2d 555, 557 (1984) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Nixon, 328 Pa.
Super. 250, 254, 476 A.2d 1313, 1315, appeal denied, 328 Pa. Super. 250, 476
A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa. Super. 219, 233, 475
A.2d 765, 772 (quoting Commonwealth v. Black, 321 Pa. Super. 44, 45, 467
A.2d 884, 885 (1983)), appeal denied, 327 Pa. Super. 219 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Knepp, 307 Pa. Super. 535, 539, 453 A.2d 1016, 1017 (1982); Commonwealth v. Burtner, 307 Pa. Super. 230, 234, 453 A.2d 10, 11 (1982) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rooney, 296 Pa. Super. 288, 292, 442 A.2d 773, 774, appeal
denied, 296 Pa. Super. 288, 442 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1982)); Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 273 Pa. Super. 600, 610, 417 A.2d 1210, 1215, appeal denied, 273 Pa.
Super. 600, 417 A.2d 1210 (1980).
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of that discretion." 4 1 Indeed, despite the supreme court's indication in Martin that it was less than happy with the prevailing standard for judging the excessiveness of a sentence on appeal, 4 2 the
courts still cling with undiminished tenacity to the pre-Martinrule
that, "[o]n appeal, a sentence may not be disturbed unless it 'exceeds the statutorily prescribed limits or is so manifestly excessive
as to constitute too severe a punishment.' "43
41. Commonwealth v. Plank, 498 Pa. 144, 145, 445 A.2d 491, 492 (1982)
(citing Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650); accord Commonwealth v. Townsend,
497 Pa. 604, 606, 443 A.2d 1139, 1140 (1982) (quoting Commonwealth v. Edrington, 490 Pa. 251, 255, 416 A.2d 455, 457 (1980)); Commonwealth v. Green,
494 Pa. 406, 410, 431 A.2d 918, 920 (1981); Commonwealth v. Knight, 479 Pa.
209, 212, 387 A.2d 1297, 1299 (1978) (citing Martin, 466 Pa. at 130 & n.20, 351
A.2d at 656 & n.20); Commonwealth v. Leta, 346 Pa. Super. 552, 561-62, 500
A.2d 85, 90 (1985); Commonwealth v. Stock, 346 Pa. Super. 60, 76, 499 A.2d
308, 317 (1985); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 344 Pa. Super. 380, 394, 496 A.2d
1156, 1164 (1985); Commonwealth v. White, 341 Pa. Super. 261, 270, 491 A.2d
252, 257 (1985); Commonwealth v. Lore, 338 Pa. Super. 42, 70, 487 A.2d 841,
856 (1984); Commonwealth v. Muller, 334 Pa. Super. 228, 236, 482 A.2d 1307,
1311 (1984); Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa. Super. 219, 233, 475 A.2d
765, 772 (quoting Commonwealth v. Black, 321 Pa. Super. 44, 45, 467 A.2d 884,
885 (1983), appeal denied, 327 Pa. Super. 219 (Pa. 1984)); Commonwealth v. Russell, 313 Pa. Super. 534, 545, 460 A.2d 316, 322 (1983); Commonwealth v.
Parry, 306 Pa. Super. 390, 393, 452 A.2d 781, 782 (1982); Commonwealth v.
Mead, 300 Pa. Super. 510, 512, 446 A.2d 971, 972-73 (1982); Commonwealth v.
Dumas, 299 Pa. Super. 335, 340, 445 A.2d 782, 784 (1982) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 Pa. Super. 464, 475, 418 A.2d 499, 505 (1980)); Commonwealth v. Landi, 280 Pa. Super. 134, 138, 421 A.2d 442, 443 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Wicks, 265 Pa. Super. 305, 310, 410 A.2d 1223, 1225 (1979)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Valentin, 259 Pa. Super. 496, 499-500, 393 A.2d
935, 937 (1978)). In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 336 Pa. Super. 609, 486 A.2d
431 (1984), appeal denied, 336 Pa. Super. 609, 486 A.2d 431 (Pa. 1985), we defined "abuse of discretion" in a sentencing decision as "not merely an error of
judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or
the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is
abused." 336 Pa. Super. at 627, 486 A.2d at 441 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Niemetz, 282 Pa. Super. 431, 445 n.12, 422 A.2d 1369, 1376 n.12 (1980), appeal
denied, 282 Pa. Super. 431, 422 A.2d 1369 (Pa. 1981)).
42. See Martin, 466 Pa. at 131-32, 351 A.2d at 657; see also Commonwealth v.
Cottle, 493 Pa. 377, 382, 426 A.2d at 598, 600 (1981) (after citing traditional
standard, court stated: "More recently, question has been raised as to the wisdom of conferring upon the sentencing court almost unlimited, unstructured
and unreviewable discretion.") (footnote omitted).
43. Commonwealth v. Kitchener, 351 Pa. Super. 613, 622, 506 A.2d 941,
946 (1986) (Roberts, J., specially assigned) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wrona,
442 Pa. 201, 206, 275 A.2d 75, 81 (1971)); accord Commonwealth v. Alicea, 498
Pa. 575, 584, 449 A.2d 1381, 1386 (1982) (McDermott, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 353 Pa. Super. 474, 477, 510 A.2d 760, 761-62 (1986);
Commonwealth v. Granberry, 346 Pa. Super. 395, 403, 499 A.2d 671, 675
(1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Button, 332 Pa. Super. 239, 243-44, 481
A.2d 342, 344 (1984)); Commonwealth v. Lore, 338 Pa. Super. 42, 70, 487 A.2d
841, 856 (1984); Commonwealth v. Maute, 336 Pa. Super. 394, 407, 485 A.2d
1138, 1145 (1984), appeal denied, 336 Pa. Super. 394 (Pa. 1985); Commonwealth
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Thus, the discretion of the sentencing court in Pennsylvania
has weathered both the passage of the Sentencing Code and the
institution of appellate review. Although the sentencing judge
now must follow the procedural rules laid down by the legislature
and the supreme court, 4 4 the setting of the actual punishment still
rests solely in the judge's hands unless the punishment he selects
45
is manifestly inappropriate to the case.
v. Anwyll, 333 Pa. Super. 453, 457, 482 A.2d 656, 657 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Nixon, 328 Pa. Super. 250, 254, 476 A.2d 1313, 1315, appeal denied, 328 Pa.
Super. 250, 476 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa.
Super. 219, 233, 475 A.2d 765, 772, appealdenied, 327 Pa. Super. 219 (Pa. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Harris, 326 Pa. Super. 64, 71, 473 A.2d 610, 611 (1984)
("The scope of appellate review of a sentencing decision is limited to sentences
that exceed the statutorily prescribed limits or those that are so manifestly excessive as to constitute a constitutionally impermissible sentence."); Commonwealth v. Knepp, 307 Pa. Super. 535, 539, 453 A.2d 1016, 1017-18 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Corson, 298 Pa. Super. 51, 56, 444 A.2d 170, 172, appeal denied, 298 Pa. Super. 51 (Pa. 1982); Commonwealth v. Rooney, 296 Pa. Super.
288, 292, 442 A.2d 773, 774-75, appeal denied, 296 Pa. Super. 288 (Pa. 1982);
Commonwealth v. Garrison, 292 Pa. Super. 326, 332, 437 A.2d 407, 410 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Boardman, 290 Pa. Super. 7, 9, 434 A.2d 102, 102 (rejecting
claim of disparity), appeal denied, 434 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v.
Harris, 286 Pa. Super. 601, 609, 429 A.2d 685, 689 (same), appeal denied, 286 Pa.
Super. 601, 429 A.2d 685 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Goldbard, 276 Pa.
Super. 193, 199, 419 A.2d 161, 163 (1980); Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 273 Pa.
Super. 600, 610, 417 A.2d 1210, 1215, appeal denied, 273 Pa. Super. 600, 417
A.2d 1210 (Pa. 1980).
44. An enlightening summary of the procedural limits on judicial sentencing discretion on the eve of the sentencing guidelines appears in an opinion
authored by my distinguished colleague, Judge StephenJ. McEwen,Jr. See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 301 Pa. Super. 17, 446 A.2d 1313 (1982).
45. Despite the legislature's amendments to the Sentencing Code which
heighten appellate scrutiny under the sentencing guidelines (42 PA. C.S.
§§ 9721(b), 9781(b), (c) (Purdon 1986)), there is still "unquestionably broad
discretion vested in a sentencing court," Commonwealth v. Dixon, 344 Pa.
Super. 293, 310, 496 A.2d 801, 810 (1985), appealgranted,509 Pa. 490, 503 A.2d
929 (1986); accord Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, No. 26 W.D. Appeal Docket
1986, slip op. at 8 (Pa. Mar. 10, 1987); Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 348 Pa.
Super. 574, 578, 502 A.2d 694, 696 (1985), whose determination "will not be
disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion." Commonwealth v.
Yacoubian, 339 Pa. Super. 413, 425, 489 A.2d 228, 232 (1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Plank, 498 Pa. 144, 145, 445 A.2d 491, 492 (1982)). The guidelines structure sentencing discretion in a new way, but exist side by side with the
indeterminate sentencing scheme already in place. Consequently, even in cases
decided under the guidelines, the courts adhere to standards of appellate review
which predate the guidelines, including the rule that "[i]f the sentence imposed
is within statutory limits, there is no abuse of discretion unless the sentence is
manifestly excessive so as to inflict too severe a punishment." Commonwealth
v. Yacoubian, 339 Pa. Super. 413, 425-26, 489 A.2d 228, 234 (1985) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gaus, 300 Pa. Super. 372, 377, 446 A.2d 661, 664 (1982));
accord Commonwealth v. Parrish, 340 Pa. Super. 528, 532, 490 A.2d 905, 907
(quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 328 Pa. Super. 498, 503, 477 A.2d 555, 557
(1984) (en banc)), appeal granted, 508 Pa. 612, 499 A.2d 1063 (1985).
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THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The requirements that a court state reasons for its sentence
and not inflict a manifestly excessive punishment obviously did
not go as far as some had intended towards establishing uniformity in the sentencing policy of the Commonwealth. Accordingly,
as the legislature and courts were experimenting gradually with
procedural sentencing reforms, the opponents of sentencing disparity renewed their call for more substantive restraints on the
sentencing power.
In 1978 the General Assembly answered the call by creating
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and directing it to
develop presumptive sentencing ranges to apply to every class of
offense and offender. The fruits of the Commission's labor-the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines-are a bittersweet victory for
the original proponents of the guidelines idea. While the guidelines will somewhat reduce sentencing disparity, they also retain
generous outlets for judicial discretion. A far more measurable
and immediate effect of the guidelines, however, will be to increase the average length of sentences handed down in the Com46
monwealth over those that judges had been imposing.
Undoubtedly this was not the goal borne foremost in mind by
sentencing reformers who believed that "uncontrolled" judges
were running amok with unduly harsh sentences.
The final form of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines
owes much to the compromise between two forces which propelled their adoption. The guidelines' original sponsors, of
course, were concerned primarily with lessening the wide disparity between sentences given in different parts of the state or
among different offenders charged with the same crime. 4 7 Another faction, however, were advocates of mandatory-minimum
sentencing legislation who decried judicial leniency in sentencing
and sought primarily to increase the certainty and severity of
sentences imposed in the Commonwealth. 48 In fact, before these
latter partisans would support the guidelines, they first led a successful move to reject proposed guidelines which the Commission
46. See Martin, supra note 3, at 96-97 & n.363.
47. See 1978 Pa. House Legislative Journal, supra note 3, at 1473; Martin,
supra note 3, at 64-65 & n.196.
48. See Martin, supra note 3, at 66, 91. Between 1977 and 1980, a period
encompassing the Commission's formulation of the initial draft of the guidelines, sentencing severity in Pennsylvania was already on the rise. See id. at 95 &
n.354. Judges, as well as legislators and commissioners, are attuned to the public's attitude on crime.
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submitted to the legislature in 1981, on the ground that the draft
guidelines were too lenient and too inhibitive of judges' discretion.4 9 The guidelines eventually adopted, therefore, provided
for longer sentences and more judicial discretion than those originally proposed. 50 Indeed, by the time the Commission submitted the new guidelines, legislative concern about sentencing
disparity had virtually disappeared, and had been replaced with a
nearly unanimous desire to get tough on crime. 5 ' Consequently,
during the same period that the General Assembly was declining
to exercise its legislative veto over the newer, more stringent
guidelines, it was also putting the mandatory-minimum sentenc52
ing legislation into place.
The Commission's need to satisfy the diverse constituents of
sentencing reform therefore played a large part in shaping its final product. However, aside from the basically political problem
of responding to these competing interests, the Commission had
what in my view was an even greater problem; that was to predetermine the appropriate range of permissible punishment for
every crime thereafter committed in the Commonwealth. A single sentencing decision is hard enough, and the judge making it
has access to a wealth of information on the individual before him
and the case at hand. It is a task of geometrically greater complexity for a tribunal to sit independently of any case and set all
future punishments by predicting and categorizing all the important variables about all the crimes yet to happen. Such a task, I
submit, would have been impossible, and for that reason the
guidelines finally implemented reflect not only a political compromise, but also a compromise with the idea that disparity in sentencing could or should be eliminated. In the end, the sentencing
commissioners realized the fundamental need in a rational sentencing scheme for the sentencer to have reasonable leeway to
adjust the sentence to the individual case, and therefore they
adopted guidelines that provide substantial windows for judicial
53
discretion.
49. See id. at 89-90 & nn.324-33.
50. See id. at 96-98 & nn.356-64, 366 & 369; id. at 111; see also id. at 86-89 &
nn.310-23 (discussing changes in initial proposed guidelines before their
rejection).
51. See id. at 91, 101-02, 110-11.
52. See id. at 99 & nn.373-75.
53. The guidelines, 204 PA. CODE §§ 303.1-.9 (Purdon 1986), went into effectJuly 22, 1982 after the General Assembly failed to reject them by concurrent
resolution within 90 days of their publication by the Commission. Seegenerally 42
PA. C.S. § 2155 (Purdon 1986). For a comprehensive survey of the process lead-
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Basic Structure of the Guidelines

The guidelines establish a recommended range of sentences
from which the judge is asked to choose the minimum term of
confinement, 54 which, as we have seen, is the most important aspect of a prison sentence in the sense that it usually represents
the time actually spent behind bars.
The two constant determinants of any guideline sentence are
the "offense gravity score," which will range from one to ten, and
the "prior record score," which goes from zero to six. For each
separate combination of these two scores, the guidelines specify a
"standard" range, a "mitigated" range, and an "aggravated"
range of sentences. Thus, for example, a crime with an offense
gravity score of seven with a prior record score of three has a
mitigated guideline range of sixteen to twenty-two months, a
standard range of twenty-two to thirty-nine months, and an aging to the guidelines becoming law, see Martin, supra note 3, at 61-99; see also Act
of Nov. 26, 1978, No. 319, § 3, 1978 Pa. Laws 1316, 1316-20 (codified as
amended at 42 PA. C.S.A. §§ 2151-2155 (Purdon 1981)) (prior to 1986 amendments) (establishing Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and giving it statutory mandate to prescribe sentencing guidelines for courts).
The guidelines adoption procedure came under immediate constitutional
attack on the ground that the legislative veto provision included in the guidelines enabling act violated the requirement of article III, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that legislation be passed only with the concurrence of
both houses of the General Assembly and after presentment to the Governor.
See Commonwealth v. Kuphal, 347 Pa. Super. 572, 500 A.2d 1205 (1985) (en
banc). Five of the nine judges hearing Kuphal agreed that the legislative veto
was unconstitutional. However, Judge Beck, one of the five judges voting to
invalidate the legislative veto, differed with her colleagues on the result, and
concurred on other grounds with the four judges in the minority to uphold the
guidelines. In her view, the legislature had made the legislative veto provision
severable from all other provisions of the guidelines enabling legislation; indeed, in her view the only portions of the legislation which were not severable
from each other were the sections which appropriated money to the Commission and 42 PA. C.S. § 9781(a), which states: "The defendant or the Commonwealth may appeal as of right the legality of the sentence." Id.; see Kuphal, 347
Pa. Super. at 576-79, 500 A.2d at 1207-09 (Beck, J., concurring) (construing Act
of Oct. 5, 1980, No. 142, § 218(c), 1980 Pa. Laws 693, 734 (repealed 1986)
(corresponds to Act of Nov. 26, 1978, No. 319, § 7, 1978 Pa. Laws 1316, 1323,
repealed by Act of Oct. 5, 1980, § 218(d))).
After its work had narrowly passed constitutional muster in Kuphal, the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing itself survived legislative review under
the Sunset Act. See 71 P.S. §§ 1795.1-.14 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The new enabling legislation reconstitutes the Commission as an agency of the General Assembly and extends its authorization to issue sentencing guidelines. See Act of
Apr. 30, 1986, No. 41, 1986 Pa. Legis. Serv. 98 (Purdon) (effective May 1, 1986).
The Commission has amended the guidelines three times since their original promulgation in 1982, with the latest changes taking effectJune 5, 1986. See
generally 42 PA. C.S. § 2155.
54. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.9(a) (1986).
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gravated range of thirty-nine to forty-nine months of minimum
confinement. 5 5 The mitigated, standard, and aggravated ranges
are continuous like this within any combination of prior record
and offense gravity scores. Each range in turn may span anywhere from one to seventy-two months, unless the range flatly
specifies non-confinement or the statutory limit as the guideline
sentence. A one point difference in offense gravity or prior record score will often raise or lower all three guideline ranges, but
often the ranges still overlap with those in the next stratum of
offense gravity or prior record score. Hence, if the prior record
score in the hypothetical is four instead of three, the standard
range becomes thirty-three to forty-nine months, thus overlapping with both the standard and aggravated ranges for the prior
record score of three.5 6 This overlapping of the guideline ranges
is more extensive for less serious offenses; for example, non-confinement remains a viable guideline sentence for many combinations of a low record score with an offense gravity score under
six.

57

The wild card in the shifting guidelines scheme is the "deadly
weapon enhancement," which requires the addition of twelve to
twenty-four months to the guideline range otherwise suggested if
a deadly weapon was possessed during the offense. 58
The "offense gravity score," as its name implies, is the Commission's way of measuring the seriousness of the various felonies
and misdemeanors which the legislature has defined. Third-degree murder is the only crime that achieves the highest offense
gravity score of ten; rape and several other first-degree felonies
involving danger to the person weigh in at nine; and so on down
the line to most misdemeanors of the third degree, which have
scores of one. 59
The offense gravity scores roughly follow the legislative classification of offenses into first-, second-, and third-degree felonies
and first-, second-, and third-degree misdemeanors. But in many
55. See id. § 303.9(b).
56. See id.

57. See generally id
58. Id. § 303.4. See Commonwealth v. Septak, 518 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986) (vacating and remanding for resentencing for failure to apply deadly
weapon enhancement). The Honorable William Franklin Cercone, former president judge of the superior court, offered a sterling comparison of sentencing
under the deadly weapon enhancement provision of the guidelines and under
the mandatory-minimum sentencing act for crimes committed with firearms. See
Commonwealth v. McKeithan, 350 Pa. Super. 160, 504 A.2d 294 (1986).

59. See 204

PA. CODE

§ 303.8 (1986).
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instances the Commission has departed from this ranking and
classified crimes independently of degree based on its own assessment of offense gravity. For example, robbery as a first-degree
felony will obtain an offense gravity score of either nine or seven
depending upon whether the robber inflicts serious bodily injury
as defined by the Pennsylvania statute. 60 The first-degree misdemeanor of providing tools of escape to an inmate has an offense
gravity score of seven, greater than the score of six assigned to
the second-degree felony of assault by a prisoner.6 ' The first-degree misdemeanor of possessing instruments of crime, on the
other hand, merits an offense gravity score of only three, which is
the same score as for the third-degree felonies of criminal tres62
pass and unlawful use of credit cards.
Legislative classifications do, however, remain important, primarily because they govern the maximum sentence a court can
impose, and hence indirectly limit the minimum sentence as well.
If the guidelines suggest a minimum sentence that exceeds one
half the maximum allowed by law, that sentence would be illegal
and the statutory limit would control instead. 63 A court could
not, for example, add the deadly weapon enhancement to a sentence in the aggravated range for a crime with an offense gravity
score of ten, two, or one, because those ranges already suggest
the statutory limit. 64 Nor could the court select from among the
full standard range of zero to six months minimum confinement
provided for the offense of possessing a small amount of marijuana, 6 5 because the statutory maximum for that offense is thirty
60. 18

PA. C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i); see also 204 PA. CODE § 303.8(d).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Commonwealth v. McKeithan, 350 Pa. Super. 160, 166, 504 A.2d
294, 297-98 (1986); 204 PA. CODE § 303.1 (i). The guidelines also do not supersede the mandatory sentencing acts. See, e.g., 42 PA. C.S. §§ 9712(c), 9713(c),
9714(c), 9715(c); 75 PA. C.S. § 3731(e)(3). However, in some cases, the guidelines may suggest a greater minimum sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nenninger, No. 290 Harrisburg 1985, slip op. at 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 1986)
(LEXIS, Pa library, Super file) (mandatory minimum 5-year penalty under 42 PA.
C.S. § 9718(a); 51/2. to 12-year sentence not cruel and unusual punishment
where guidelines suggested 61/2 to 81/2 years as minimum sentence); see also
Commonwealth of Pa. Comm'n on Sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual 85 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter cited as "Implementation Manual"). But see Commonwealth v. Grimmit, 512 A.2d 43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(court should not impose deadly weapon enhancement where mandatory minimum penalty for crimes committed with firearms applicable).
64. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.9(b); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoover, 342 Pa.
Super. 163, 167, 492 A.2d 443, 445 (1985).
65. See 204 PA. CODE, §§ 303.8(d), 303.9(b).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss5/3

20

Cirillo: Windows for Discretion in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines

1986]

JUDGES' ESSAYS

1329

days .66
The other element of the guidelines which the Commission
used considerable discretion in devising is the "prior record
score," which gauges the number and seriousness of the defendant's previous convictions. The guidelines award three prior record points for each conviction or juvenile adjudication for
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and various first-degree felonies; two points for each infraction of various other felony statutes; and one point for each weapons misdemeanor or one of the
remaining felonies. 6 7 In addition, the Commission has allotted
one point for two or three prior non-weapons misdemeanors, and
two points for four or more such convictions. 6 8 Regardless of the
quantity and quality of a defendant's prior convictions, however,
his prior record score can never be greater than six, 6 9 which
raises some questions about the court's proper response when
the defendant's criminal record exceeds all expectations. This,
however, is a topic for the discussion which follows.
B.

The Windows for Discretion

Even before reaching the windows for discretion in the sentencing guidelines, we can well imagine that they provide ample
scope for deviation in exceptional cases. A rudimentary review of
the sentencing grid which the guidelines establish has revealed
66. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31), (g) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
67. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.7(b).
68. See id. § 303.7(a). However, in Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa.
Super. 128, 511 A.2d 221, appealgranted, 518 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1986), the superior
court held that the Sentencing Commission had exceeded its authority in assigning prior record score points for non-weapons misdemeanors. The Samuels
court interpreted the guidelines enabling act, which before a 1986 amendment
(2) Specify a range of
stated, in pertinent part: "The guidelines shall: ....
sentences of increased severity for defendants previously convicted of a felony
or felonies or convicted of a crime involving the use of a deadly weapon." 42 PA.
C.S.A. § 2154 (Purdon 1981) (prior to 1986 amendment). The court concluded
that this section gave the Commission no power to mandate the inclusion of
misdemeanors not involving the use of a deadly weapon in the calculation of
prior record score. See 354 Pa. Super. at 135, 511 A.2d at 237; accord Commonwealth v. Washington, 516 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). In Commonwealth v.
Tilghman, No. 770 Philadelphia 1985 (Pa. Super. Ct. argued Apr. 7, 1986) (en
banc), the court took up the related issue of whether the Commission had been
empowered to include juvenile adjudications as part of the prior record score.
The legislature, however, has now amended 42 PA. C.S.A. § 2154, specifically
directing the Commission to "[s]pecify a range of sentences of increased severity
for defendants previously convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for one or more
misdemeanor or felony offenses committed prior to the current offense." Act of
Dec. 11, 1986, No. 165, sec. 3, § 2154(a)(2), 1986 Pa. Legis. Serv. 97, 105-06
(Purdon) (effective Feb. 9, 1987) (emphasis added).
69. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.7(i).
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that the sentences prescribed there are not set in stone; instead,
they allow reasonable movement even within a given range.
Thus, a judge facing a two-time narcotics salesman with a considerable record in the County of Philadelphia, where such crimes
are relatively commonplace, jails comparatively full, and
sentences traditionally lenient, might well choose to impose a

substantial though not oppressive sentence of five to ten years'
imprisonment. His counterpart in Mercer County, where drug
dealers are far scarcer and judges perhaps less disposed to leniency, might select six and a half to fifteen years for the same crime

in the same circumstances. Both will have sentenced well within
the guidelines, and within the applicable standard range of the
guidelines at that. Indeed, the drafters of the guidelines contemplated precisely such regional variations in sentencing practice
when they drew the guideline ranges so broadly. 70
As I have already pointed out, the guidelines' liberal allowance for variation is at its widest at the bottom end of the offense
gravity scale. In fact, the guidelines should have no substantial
effect on incarceration rates and lengths for most misdemeanors
of the second and third degrees, because, taking into account the
aggravated and mitigated ranges for such crimes with offense
gravity scores of one or two, the guidelines permit the selection of
any sentence from non-confinement to the statutory limit as the
guideline sentence, almost regardless of prior record score. 71 In
essence, therefore, according to one scholar, the guidelines leave
70. See 1978 Pa. House Legislative Journal, supra note 3, at 1475. Representative Scirica explained:
The directive in the statute to the commission is that the guidelines
must prescribe a range of sentences ....
Within that particular range,
county X may feel more comfortable in sentencing at the bottom part
of that range whereas county Y may want to go to the upper part of the
range, so I think there is going to be enough flexibility in there to have
some differences.
Id. Representative Scirica not only sponsored the guidelines bill in the House of
Representatives, but he was also a member of the original Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing as a legislator, and then acceded to the chairmanship of
that body after his election to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.
See Martin, supra note 3, at 71-72, 94. Judge Scirica chaired the Commission that
promulgated the version of the guidelines which successfully became law in
1982. He has since accepted appointment to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. If there exists an authority on the sentencing guidelines, it is Judge Scirica.
71. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.8(c)(3) (setting offense gravity scores of two and
one respectively for most second- and third-degree misdemeanors). "Statutory
limit" in this context means the longest minimum sentence permitted by law. Id.
§ 303.9(b).
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' 72
judicial discretion in sentencing misdemeanants "untouched. "
Having to articulate the requisite aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to take full advantage of the guidelines' ranges
should not prove unduly burdensome for judges, since the guidelines permit any legally cognizable factor to serve as aggravation
or mitigation. 73 The court is subject only to the requirement that
it state what factors it relied on to sentence within the aggravated
or mitigated range. 74 Thus, for example, the superior court has,
found the particular callousness and brutality of an offense to be
sufficient reason to sentence in the aggravated range for murder
of the third degree. 75 Because the guidelines supplement and do
not supersede the Sentencing Code, any factor which the Code
weighs in favor of an order of probation would seem to weigh in
favor of sentencing in the mitigated range of the guidelines, or, in
the appropriate case, even going outside them where the mitigated range suggests confinement. 76 Nor would the factors listed

72. Martin, supra note 3, at 109.
73. See Commonwealth v. Hoover, 342 Pa. Super. 163, 166, 492 A.2d 443,
444 (1985); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 341 Pa. Super. 217, 224, 491 A.2d 230,
233 (1985); Implementation Manual, supra note 63, at 45.
74. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.3(2). The legislature rejected initial draft
guidelines which contained exclusive lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Martin, supra note 3, at 82 & n.293, 90 & n.329. "It seems clear...
that the legislature, while mindful of the guideline's purpose to promote more
uniform sentencing across the Commonwealth, nevertheless, feared that adherence to an exclusive list of factors would unduly fetter the sentencing judge's
traditional discretion in this area." Commonwealth v. Duffy, 341 Pa. Super. 217,
223, 491 A.2d 230, 232 (1985).
75. See Commonwealth v. Hoover, 342 Pa. Super. 163, 166, 492 A.2d 443,
444 (1985).
76. Section 9722 of the Sentencing Code provides:
The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the
court, shall be accorded weight in favor of an order of probation:
(1) The criminal conduct of the defendant neither caused
nor threatened serious harm.
(2) The defendant did not contemplate that his conduct
would cause or threaten serious harm.
(3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation.
(4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse orjustify the criminal conduct of the defendant, though failing to establish a defense.
(5) The victim of the criminal conduct of the defendant induced or facilitated its commission.
(6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the
victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he
sustained.
(7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or
criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime.
(8) The criminal conduct of the defendant was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur.
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in section 9722 in any way exhaust the possibilities for sentence
mitigation, which would seem to be limited only by the considerations in the Sentencing Code which favor substantial
77
confinement.
An issue has arisen in the appellate courts over whether a
defendant's prior record can be considered as an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance notwithstanding that the prior record is
already factored into any guideline sentence through the prior
record score. Any defendant with two prior serious felony convictions garners the highest possible prior record score of six. 78
However, suppose the defendant has an extensive history of criminal activity, of which the two felonies counted in the prior record
score are but a small representative sampling. Could not the sentencing judge, in his sound discretion, determine that the sheer
incorrigibility of the defendant in his devotion to criminal behavior warranted a sentence in or beyond the aggravated range? The
superior court has found this to be a reasonable response where
the defendant's excessive recidivism reflects on his character as
someone unlikely to be rehabilitated. 79 Similarly, although lack
(9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that
he is unlikely to commit another crime.
(10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment.
(11) The confinement of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to him or his dependents.
(12) Such other grounds as indicate the desirability of
probation.
42 PA. C.S. § 9722. Some, but not all, of these factors appeared in the exclusive
list of mitigating factors which the legislature rejected along with the initial draft
guidelines. See Martin, supra note 3, at 82 n.293. It could well be that the legislature did not want the guidelines interpreted as shortening the list of factors relevant to the alternative of probation.
One factor which made the Commission's original list of mitigating factors,
but which is not specifically mentioned in the Sentencing Code, is the defendant's cooperation in the prosecution of others. See id. Since January 2, 1986,
this consideration has been incorporated into the guidelines as a circumstance
which "may warrant a sentence less severe than suggested in [the guidelines]."
204 PA. CODE § 303.1(e); see also Implementation Manual, supra note 63, at 37.
77. See 42 PA. C.S. §§ 9721(b), 9725.
78. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.7(b)(2), (i).
79. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mills, 344 Pa. Super. 200, 496 A.2d 752
(1985) (affirming maximum sentence beyond aggravated range for eighth burglary conviction); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 341 Pa. Super. 217, 491 A.2d 230
(1985) (affirming sentence in aggravated range based partly on long prior record); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa. Super. 338, 491 A.2d 845
(1985) (affirming sentence in aggravated range arrived at partly through consideration of summary offense convictions not factored into prior record score);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 335 Pa. Super. 99, 483 A.2d 974 (1984) (affirming
sentence beyond aggravated range based in part on unsentenced prior conviction not included in prior record score); see generally Implementation Manual,
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of a criminal record is already taken into account in the prior record score, query whether a lifelong commitment to community
involvement or peaceful and quiet citizenship in general would
justify mitigating the guideline sentence or going below the floor
of the mitigated range. The court has held, though, that a sentence should not be aggravated or mitigated based "solely" on a
80
factor included in the calculation of prior record score.
Before proceeding from the liberal ranges of the guidelines
themselves to the standards which govern deviations from them,
we should touch upon some of the areas of sentencing discretion
with which the guidelines do not deal at all. Certain types of sentencing decisions, whose importance should not be overlooked,
are completely exempt from the guidelines' reach. The guidelines do not regulate the imposition of fines and restitution,8 ' nor
the choice between total and partial confinement.8 2 Except insofar as the law requires that a maximum sentence must be at least
twice the minimum, the guidelines do not govern the maximum
sentence,8 3 i.e., "the maximum period that society must exercise
supra note 63, at 45 ("Factors which may not be used to justify an aggravated or
mitigated range sentence include items which are already counted in the guidelines, such as offense of conviction, possession of a deadly weapon, and prior
convictions and adjudications which are counted in the prior record score.") (emphasis added).
80. See Commonwealth v. Bartlow, 512 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (vacating sentence beyond aggravated range); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 349 Pa.
Super. 310, 503 A.2d 14 (1986) (same); Commonwealth v. Terrizzi, 348 Pa.
Super. 607, 502 A.2d 711 (1985) (finding proper partial reliance on prior record
as aggravation); see also Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, 341 Pa. Super. 468, 475,
491 A.2d 1352, 1355 (1985) (lack of prior record could not be used as ground
for deviating from guidelines; court found insufficient evidence of "community
activity").
81. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.1 (g).
82. Partial confinement is probably underutilized as a sentencing alternative. Partial confinement operates much like probation in that it can be made
subject to the same terms and conditions and allows the offender to work, go to
school, or pursue other gainful activities outside prison walls, yet at the same
time it allows authorities to exercise closer supervision over the offender during
the periods when he is confined. See generally 42 PA. C.S. § 9755. The court may
even order the offender to pay board in prison. See id. § 9755(f)(1). However,
the court should choose total over partial confinement where it finds that
(1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or partial
confinement the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the crime of
the defendant.
Id. § 9725.
83. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.9(a); Implementation Manual, supra note 63, at
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control over the offender to minimize the possibility of future antisocial behavior." 8 4 The guidelines do not infringe on the jurisdiction of the Board of Probation and Parole to grant parole and
revoke it, nor do they affect the power of the sentencing court to
parole a prisoner before the end of the guideline sentence where
the total maximum sentence is less than two years.8 5 The guidelines do not apply to sentencing decisions upon revocation of
probation, 6 nor to the length or conditions of a probationary
sentence if probation is a permitted sentencing alternative or is
added to the guideline sentence. 7 They do not inhibit the
court's ability to place the offender in pre-sentence diversionary
programs or accelerated rehabilitative disposition. 8 The guidelines also do not deal with summary offenses.
One of the most striking areas of sentencing discretion which
the guidelines leave unregulated is the decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple crimes
arising out of the same or separate transactions. The possible
consequences for sentencing disparity are enormous because the
offender upon whom the court imposes cumulative punishment
may end up serving many times the sentence served by a similarly
situated offender for whom separate sentences are ordered to run
concurrently. The guidelines' only statement on consecutive
sentences is that the defendant's prior record score counts only
for the crime of highest offense gravity where the court gives separate sentences for convictions arising out of the same transaction.8 9 The Sentencing Code offers no further guidance on the
matter, simply providing that "the court ...may impose [the
sanctioned sentencing alternatives] consecutively or concurrently
...."90 Thus, it has been left entirely to the common-law standard of abuse of discretion to arbitrate the reasonableness or propriety of sentences imposed consecutively for separate crimes. 9 '
84. Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 136 n.l, 351 A.2d 650, 659 n.1
(1976) (Nix, J., dissenting).
85. See Implementation Manual, supra note 63, at 84.
86. 204 PA. CODE § 303.1 (f). Probation revocations are governed by 42 PA.
C.S. § 9771.

87. See Implementation Manual, supra note 63, at 83. See generally 42 PA.

C.S. § 9722 (factors militating in favor of probation); id. § 9754 (relating to conditions of probation).
88. See generally PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-185.
89. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.6(a).
90. 42 PA. C.S. § 9721 (a).
91. See Commonwealth v. Plank, 498 Pa. 144, 445 A.2d 491 (1982) (consecutive prison terms for two offenses not abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v.
Pierce, 497 Pa. 437, 441 A.2d 1218 (1982) (court could impose prison sentence
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More notable still than either the width of the guidelines'
ranges or the aspects of sentencing they leave unaffected, however, is the fact that the guidelines clearly are not nor were they
intended to be mandatory; they are merely recommendatory or
presumptive as to how the judge should exercise his discretion in
the absence of good and sufficient reasons to the contrary. "The
Sentencing Guidelines were enacted to provide a guide to the
courts; they are not mandatory." 9 2 The guidelines are "advisory to
all trial judges before they sentence any particular individual....
The guidelines are not mandatory on the sentencing judge. They
93
are merely that, guidelines."
If in fact the guidelines are not mandatory in the sense that
the judge is not necessarily bound to follow them, one might
and probation consecutively for one robbery); Commonwealth v. Button, 332
Pa. Super. 239, 481 A.2d 342 (1984) (consecutive life sentences not abuse of
discretion); Commonwealth v. Green, 312 Pa. Super. 265, 458 A.2d 951 (1983)
(consecutive sentences for robberies proper); Commonwealth v. Ziomek, 291
Pa. Super. 251, 435 A.2d 894 (1981) (consecutive sentences on seven counts
totalling fourteen to thirty-two years not manifestly excessive). The supreme
court in Martin stated that "the same factors relevant to other determinations of
sentencing are applicable to the decision to have terms of imprisonment run
consecutively rather than concurrently." Martin, 466 Pa. at 132 n.23, 351 A.2d
at 657 n.23 (citing Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.4 (Approved Draft 1968)). The appellate courts of the Commonwealth paid little attention to this statement in Martin until Commonwealth v.
Simpson, 353 Pa. Super. 474, 510 A.2d 760 (1986), wherein the superior court
found six consecutive robbery sentences totalling thirty to sixty years to be a
manifestly excessive abuse of the trial court's discretion. The court noted that
a cumulative minimum sentence of thirty years ...

would take a rela-

tively young man through the prime of his life for a term twice as long
as the average life sentence, under a system which ...

does not permit

review and parole upon good behavior in substantially less time than
the minimum sentence provides....
To impose a minimum sentence of thirty years discounts the possibility of rehabilitation and effectively removes appellant from society
for his potential working life, precluding the possibility of his ever becoming a contributing member of society.
id. at 481-82, 510 A.2d at 763-64.
A further common-law restraint on consecutive sentences comes into play
where multiple crimes in one transaction "merge," to wit, where the sentencing
judge is empowered to impose only one sentence despite the Commonwealth's
proof of multiple statutory violations. "Merger" of offenses for sentencing purposes occurs where one crime is "necessarily involved" in another and causes no
distinct harm. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 344 Pa. Super. 108, 496 A.2d 31
(1985) (en banc); see also Commonwealth v. Sayko, 515 A.2d 894 (Pa. 1986). A
court has no discretion to impose separate sentences on merged offenses, because such sentences are "illegal," and beyond the power of the court to impose.
See Williams, 344 Pa. Super. at 125, 496 A.2d at 41.
92. Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 348 Pa. Super. 574, 578, 502 A.2d 694,
696 (1985) (emphasis added).
93. 1978 Pa. House Legislative Journal 1474 (statement of Rep. Scirica)
(emphasis added).
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wonder how they can achieve their goals of lessening sentencing
disparity and instituting sentences of greater certainty and severity for society's worst offenders. The remainder of this discussion
of the windows for discretion in the guidelines will focus on the
manner in which they "guide" and "advise" the sentencing court,
and on the ways in which the presumption of appropriateness of
the guideline sentence may be overcome in favor of a greater or
lesser sentence than the guidelines suggest.
The guidelines state that "[t]he court shall consider [the guidelines] in determining the appropriate sentence for felonies and
misdemeanors." 94 The Sentencing Code, after the 1978 amendments, similarly states that "[t]he court shall . . .consider any
guidelines for sentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect [pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.
§ 2155]." 9 5 In addition to requiring consideration of the guidelines, section 9721(b) of the Code states: "In every case where
the court imposes a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines
...the court shall provide a contemporaneous written statement
of the reason or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines." 9 6
The guidelines contain nearly identical language in section
97
303.1(h).
Thus, the least common denominators of guidelines compliance are consideration of their sentencing ranges, and a statement of reasons on the record for sentencing above or below
them. However, just as in the case for sentencing in the aggravated or mitigated ranges, the guidelines have little to say about
how much consideration the guidelines are due in comparison
94. 204 PA. CODE § 303.1(a) (emphasis added).
95. 42 PA. C.S. § 9721(b) (emphasis added).
96. Id. But see Commonwealth v. Royer, 328 Pa. Super. 60, 476 A.2d 453
(1984) (court held that recorded oral statement in defendant's presence would
suffice).
97. Both 42 PA. C.S. § 9721(b) and 204 PA. CODE § 303.1(h) have a separate clause requiring the court to state reasons on the record in open court for
any sentence imposed. These provisions codify the Riggins rule. For a further
discussion of Riggins, see supra note 21 and notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
The Riggins requirement, as well as the other requirements of the Sentencing
Code, apply independently of guidelines compliance. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Rivera, 338 Pa. Super. 199, 487 A.2d 923 (1985) (vacating sentence within
guidelines for lack of compliance with Sentencing Code); see also Commonwealth
v. Ruffo, No. 1419 Philadelphia 1986 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1987) (vacating
sentences outside guidelines for failure to consider anything but seriousness of
crimes); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 347 Pa. Super. 64, 500 A.2d 158 (1985) (affirming sentence outside guidelines; addressing compliance with Sentencing
Code as separate issue).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss5/3

28

Cirillo: Windows for Discretion in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines

1986]

JUDGES' ESSAYS

1337

with other factors, or just what reasons are adequate to justify departing altogether from the guidelines.
Therefore, the provisions of the Sentencing Code which authorize appellate review of sentencing decisions under the guidelines take on crucial importance; As Representative Scirica was
fond of saying, 98 what gives "teeth" to the guidelines is the limited right to appellate review which the guidelines enabling act
established for both the Commonwealth and defendants. 99 Ultimately it will be up to the appellate court to determine how binding the guidelines are in a particular case.
As discussed earlier, the standard of common-law appellate
review before the guidelines appeared was not particularly stringent. As long as the sentencing court followed the proper procedure in sentencing a defendant, the sentence would not be
disturbed absent manifest excessiveness or illegality.' 0 0 The
Commonwealth had no right to appeal the sentence unless it was
illegal. 10 1
However, the new Sentencing Code provisions have opened
up the discretionary aspects of sentencing to a more searching
appellate scrutiny. Under section 9781 of the Code, the legislature has specifically instructed the appellate court to determine
whether the sentencing court has adequately considered the
guidelines in imposing sentence. Section 9781's provisions,
which are among the most explicit standards the legislature has
directed to any appellate court on any subject, are worth setting
forth here at length:
(b) Allowance of appeal.-The defendant or the
Commonwealth may file a petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor to the appellate court that has
initial jurisdiction for such appeals. Allowance of appeal
may be granted at the discretion of the appellate court
where it appears that there is a substantial question that
the sentence imposed is not appropriate under this
chapter.
(c) Determination on appeal.-The appellate court
98. See 1978 Pa. House Legislative Journal 1476 (statement of Rep. Scirica).
99. See 42 PA. C.S. § 9781.
100. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
101. See Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 206-07, 275 A.2d 78, 80-81
(1971) (Commonwealth could not appeal sentence unless it was outside statutory limits or constitutionally impermissible).
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shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but applied
the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the
sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines
would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
sentencing guidelines and the sentence is
unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
(d) Review of record.-In reviewing the record the
appellate court shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to
observe the defendant, including any presentence
investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was
based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the
commission. 102
102. 42 PA. C.S. § 9781(b)-(d). While allowance of appeal under subsection (b) is discretionary with the appellate court, subsection (a) of the statute
preserves the right of the Commonwealth or the defendant to appeal the "legality" of the sentence. Id. § 9781(a). The distinction between the "legality" of a
sentence and other aspects which bear on its validity is sometimes tricky to define, but as a general statement an "illegal" sentence is one the court had no
power to impose, such as one exceeding the statutory limit, whereas an "improper" sentence would be one within the court's power to impose, but rendered voidable on appeal because the court proceeded improperly or otherwise
abused its discretion. Judge Spaeth gave an instructive explanation of the difference in Commonwealth v. Tolassi, 303 Pa. Super. 177, 179-82, 449 A.2d 636,
637-38, appeal denied, 303 Pa. Super. 177 (Pa. 1982). The major significance of
the distinction is that improprieties in sentencing can be waived, but illegality
cannot. See 303 Pa. Super. at 180-82, 449 A.2d at 638; Commonwealth v. Whetstine, 344 Pa. Super. 246, 256-57, 496 A.2d 777, 782 (1985) (excessiveness and
Riggins issues waived; merger issues preserved); Commonwealth v. Reardon, 297
Pa. Super. 193, 199-200, 443 A.2d 792, 795 (1981). Guidelines compliance is a
waivable issue, and the superior court will find such issues waived where they
have not been raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify ad-
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Essentially, this statute decrees that the appellate court must
consider the sentencing guidelines in determining whether the
trial court has abused its discretion. Although guidelines compliance is not the only factor governing the determination on appeal, the record must at least show that the sentencing court gave
due consideration to the guidelines before imposing sentence.
This means that a prerequisite to the validity of any sentence
outside the guidelines will be for the trial court to calculate offense gravity and prior record scores correctly, and identify the
corresponding ranges of punishment recommended by the guidelines. 10 3 Although the trial court is vested with the right, in the
proper exercise of its discretion, to sentence outside the guidelines, it is imperative that before making that determination the
correct starting point in the guidelines be determined. "[Where]
that was not done. . ., it is necessary that the sentence be recondressed to the sentencing court. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mease, 516 A.2d 24, 29
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); see PA. R. CRIM. P. 1405(c), 1410; see also Commonwealth v.
Gallagher, 353 Pa. Super. 426, 453, 510 A.2d 735, 749 (1986) (alternative
holding).
Another important provision of § 9781 is subsection (f), which states that
"[n]o appeal of the discretionary aspects of the sentence shall be permitted beyond the appellate court that has initial jurisdiction for such appeals." 42 PA.
C.S. § 9781(f). The effect of this provision is to limit the jurisdiction of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court over sentencing questions under the guidelines,
since the superior court has "initial jurisdiction" over appeals from judgments
of sentence, except death sentences. To my knowledge the supreme court has
not yet ruled on a sentencing issue under the guidelines, although it will be
interesting to see what the court decides in Commonwealth v. Dixon, 344 Pa.
Super. 293, 496 A.2d 802 (1985), appeal granted, 509 Pa. 490, 503 A.2d 929
(1986) and Commonwealth v. Parrish, 340 Pa. Super. 528, 490 A.2d 905, appeal
granted, 508 Pa. 612, 499 A.2d 1063 (1985), since the sole issue in those cases
was whether the sentencing court abused its discretion under the guidelines. See
also Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, No. 26 W.D. Appeal Docket 1986, slip op. at
5 n.4 (Pa. Mar. 10, 1987) (Larsen, J., dissenting ("I interpret section 978 1(f) as
permitting [the supreme court] to review a ruling by an intermediate appellate court
which is an abuse of discretion or exceeds its authority." (emphasis added)); cf. Commonwealth v. Tomasso, 506 Pa. 344, 485 A.2d 395 (1984) (per curiam)
(supreme court decided sentencing appeal under interim guidelines act with
similar restriction on appellate review).
103. The superior court has held that the sentencing court's failure to indicate its awareness of the proper guideline ranges at the sentencing hearing is
grounds for vacating a sentence outside the guidelines, irrespective of whether
the court's reasons for the sentence were otherwise sufficient or the sentence
otherwise reasonable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chesson, 353 Pa. Super. 255,
509 A.2d 875 (1986) (court failed to state guideline ranges at sentencing); Commonwealth v.Johnakin, 348 Pa. Super. 432, 502 A.2d 620 (1985) (court improperly computed offense gravity score and failed to add weapon enhancement);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 340 Pa. Super. 72, 489 A.2d 845 (1985) (ambiguity in
record about proper offense gravity score for robbery); Commonwealth v.
Royer, 328 Pa. Super. 60, 476 A.2d 453 (1984) (failure to state guideline sentence ranges).
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sidered."' 0 4 Of course, "[i]f the court sentences within the guidelines' suggested ranges, there is no need for the sentencing court
to otherwise manifest on the record that it considered the guidelines. In such a case, consideration of the guidelines is presumed
to be evidenced by the actual sentence imposed."' 0 5
If the trial court duly considers the guidelines, but sentences
outside their ranges, the statute directs the appellate court to
strike down the sentence if it is "unreasonable."' 1 6 If within the
guidelines, the sentence will stand unless "clearly unreasonable." 1 0 7 Although the art of assessing the "reasonableness" of a
sentence would not seem to be something that changes radically
in a short period of time, appellate review under the guidelines
has changed the definition of "reasonableness," primarily be-

cause the court now must "have regard for" the guidelines along
with the nature of the crime, the characteristics of the defendant,
and the information before the trial court which traditionally went
into determining the reasonableness of a sentence. 0 8 The result
is a more constrictive appellate review which presumptively defers
to the propriety of the guideline sentence, and tolerates deviations "only in exceptional cases."' 1 9 The idea of tailoring a sen-

tence to the individual, and to the particular circumstances of his
crime, has become secondary to the perceived goals of the guide104. Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, 341 Pa. Super. 468, 474, 491 A.2d
1352, 1355 (1985) (error not to consider weapon enhancement).
105. Commonwealth v. Chesson, 353 Pa. Super. 255, 256, 509 A.2d 875,
876 (1986) (dictum). But cf. Commonwealth v. Dickison, 334 Pa. Super. 549,
483 A.2d 874 (1984) (not harmless error to assign wrong offense gravity score to
a burglary even though sentence imposed was within normal range for either
score).
106. 42 PA. C.S. § 9781(c)(3).
107. Id. § 9781(c)(2). The statute's threshold proviso that the appellate
court may allow an appeal "where it appears that there is a substantial question
that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under this chapter [the Sentencing
Code]," is likely to weed out most appeals from sentences that are within the
guidelines. See id. § 9781(b); Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, No. 26 W.D. Appeal Docket 1986 (Pa. Mar. 10, 1987) (under section 9781(b), superior court
may not reach question whether trial court abused its discretion under guidelines unless appellant first demonstrates there is a substantial question that the
sentence is inappropriate under the Code); see also Commonwealth v. Easterling,
353 Pa. Super. 84, 87-90 & nn.1-4, 509 A.2d 345, 347-48 & nn.1-4 (1986) (discussing "substantial question" in terms of § 9781(c) criteria). Sentences that
make it past the threshold finding still must be affirmed unless they are "clearly
unreasonable."
108. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9781(d).
109. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 343 Pa. Super. 596, 599, 495 A.2d
956, 958 (1985); accord Commonwealth v. Mattis, 352 Pa. Super. 144, 154, 507
A.2d 423, 428 (1986) (quoting Hutchinson); Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 345 Pa.
Super. 167, 171, 497 A.2d 1357, 1359 (1985) (same).
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lines to "insure that more uniform sentences are imposed in this
Commonwealth,"' 10 and to make criminal sentences more rational and consistent.1"'
Of course, implicit in the requirement of section 9721 (b) that
a trial court state reasons for departing from the guidelines is the
recognition that there may be adequate reasons in particular
cases why the guideline sentence is not appropriate. "Clearly,
had the Legislature intended the Guidelines to remove the discretion of the trial judge from sentencing, it would not have included
language in the Code that acknowledges inevitable instances of
departure from them." ' 2 However, in the vacuum left by the legislature's declining to dictate what reasons for departure are adequate, and by the guidelines' own silence on the subject save the
stricture against double counting," 3 the courts have been quick
to reject reasons proffered for deviating from the guidelines, and
hesitant to accept factors offered in support of deviation that
under the old sentencing scheme would easily have justified a
sentence in the appellate courts." 14
The "rehabilitative needs of the defendant," in particular,
have lost favor, and usually will be viewed as weak reasons for
guidelines deviation when presented in the context of a reprehensible offense. The superior court has found a twenty-two-month
sentence for aggravated assault with a knife unreasonably lenient
and unjustified by the court's rationale that it was the defendant's
first prison sentence;"1 5 a six-month sentence and three years'
probation for a fourth drug violation unjustified by the trial jurist's concern that the defendant would not have an effective drug
rehabilitation program in prison;" 6 eight months and probation
110. Commonwealth v. Royer, 328 Pa. Super. 60, 66, 476 A.2d 453, 456
(1984).
111. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 343 Pa. Super. 596, 598, 495 A.2d
956, 958 (1985).
112. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 347 Pa. Super. 64, 71, 500 A.2d 158, 161
(1985).
113. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
114. This style of appellate review may be close to that envisioned by the
drafters of the original guidelines before their revision and submission to the
legislature. These guidelines stated that the sentencing court could depart from
the guidelines only for "compelling reasons." Martin, supra note 3, at 83 &
n.294. Such a standard was adopted in Minnesota's guidelines, also a subject of
Martin's article, providing for deviations only in "substantial and compelling circumstances." Id. at 55-56 & n.159.
115. Commonwealth v. Mattis, 352 Pa. Super. 144, 507 A.2d 423 (1986).
116. Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 345 Pa. Super. 167, 497 A.2d 1357
(1985).
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for a kidnapping at gunpoint unwarranted by the judge's desire to
protect the defendant, who had twice been sexually assaulted in
prison;' 17 and a county jail sentence for burglary imposed so the
court could retain parole authority over the defendant should he
get into a drug program an unreasonable deviation from the lowest mitigated minimum sentence of twenty-five months imprisonment.11 8 On the other hand, a well-conceived and convincingly
explained departure from the guideline ranges based on either
retributive considerations or a careful balancing of the offender's
needs with those of society will still find an open ear in the appellate courts. The superior court has affirmed precisely such wellreasoned guideline departures where the trial court took the time
to list the factors which compelled it not to follow the guideline
sentence." 9 The sine qua non of any guideline departure is a cogent statement of reasons by the sentencing jurist. 20 And a necessary condition to stating the reasons for a deviation is to first
ascertain the range of sentences which would govern the case if it
were not worthy of deviation. These are simple expedients, and
any judge engaging in them will, if his reasons are reasonable,
117. Commonwealth v. Days, 349 Pa. Super. 188, 502 A.2d 1339 (1986).
118. Commonwealth v. Easterling, 353 Pa. Super. 84, 509 A.2d 345 (1986).
119. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 348 Pa. Super. 574, 502 A.2d
694 (1985) (affirming strict drug probation on four counts of delivery of drugs, a
deviation from mitigated minimum range of two to four months, where defendant was good prospect for rehabilitation and incarceration would damage family
relationship and defendant's psychological makeup); Commonwealth v. Vanderhorst, 347 Pa. Super. 648, 501 A.2d 262 (1985) (relying on defendant's background, character, and definite overtones of self-defense to affirm ten-year
probationary sentence for voluntary manslaughter where incarceration would
serve no useful purpose); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 347 Pa. Super. 64, 500
A.2d 158 (1985) (affirming four-month to ten-year sentence for sex offenses
where psychiatric report, defendant's contrition and rehabilitative prospects,
family ties offered in support); Commonwealth v. Mills, 344 Pa. Super. 200, 496
A.2d 752 (1985) (affirming sentence beyond aggravated range where repeat
criminal behavior showed defendant had little chance of rehabilitation).
120. After setting forth the requirement that the sentencing court state reasons for deviating from the guidelines, section 9721 (b) states: "Failure to comply shall be grounds for vacating the sentence and resentencing the defendant."
42 Pa. C.S. § 9721 (b). The superior court has relied on this provision independently of the requirements of § 9781 (c) to vacate sentences departing from the
guidelines solely for the trial court's failure to state reasons for the departure.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chesson, 353 Pa. Super. 255, 509 A.2d 875 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Catapano, 347 Pa. Super. 375, 500 A.2d 882 (1985). Since
the above-quoted provision came into the Sentencing Code along with not only
the guidelines legislation, but also the other 1978 amendments, the "failure to
comply" it refers to may mean any failure to comply with the general standards
of § 9721 (b). Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, No. 26 W.D. Appeal Docket 1986,
slip op. at 6 (Pa. Mar. 10, 1987). Query, however, whether an appellate court
must vacate a sentence departing from the guidelines for a failure to state reasons therefor if the sentence is not "unreasonable" under § 9781(c)(3).
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face a far greater likelihood of seeing his sentence upheld on
appeal.
There are windows for discretion in the sentencing guidelines. For judges wise enough to open them, the full panoply of
reasoned discretion which sentencers enjoyed under the old system will continue to be available, and society's concerns about
"undue, unjustifiable, or unwarranted disparity,"' 2 and about
the lack of fairness and certainty in criminal punishment will also
be vindicated.
IV.

AN OVERVIEW

The Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines channel and control
judges' sentencing discretion in order to reduce disparity and uncertainty in criminal sentencing, and the appellate decisions
which have had to answer final questions on the guidelines' applicability have most emphasized this aspect of their nature. However, the guidelines supplement and do not displace a full-fledged
indeterminate sentencing scheme under which the discretion of
the judge is directed to the individual case at hand, and not to
other cases in an attempt to impose a standard sentence. Moreover, reducing disparity was just one of the goals sought by the
sentencing reform movement responsible for the guidelines; the
other goal, equally if not more important, was to institute tougher
sentencing policies over the objections of unwilling judges-in
other words, to make sure that criminals did time.
From all appearances, the message from the legislature
worked, and judges are doing their duty to put criminals behind
bars. In some cases, judges simply no longer have a choice about
the matter, with the mandatory-minimum sentencing acts being
upheld and enforced. In other cases, judges continue to exercise
discretion, but under constraints that would have seemed foreign
to the American way of jurisprudence of their counterparts from
the heyday of "uncontrolled" sentencing discretion.
Before rushing to praise the new system for its payoffs in certainty, severity, and predictability in sentencing, however, let us
pause to reflect on the wisdom of the old ways, when judges, not
legislators or committees, were primarily responsible for judgments of sentence. The eulogy will be delivered by a friend,
Judge Scirica, who almost single-handedly brought the guidelines
to fruition, first as legislative sponsor of the guidelines bill, then
121. 1978 Pa. House Legislative Journal 1475 (statement of Rep. Scirica).
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as member and chairman of the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing. Judge Scirica spoke on the subject of mandatory sentencing, but his comments are equally applicable to any substantial fettering of a judge's discretion to fit the punishment to the
particular crime and offender:
Mandatory sentences do not work. It is impossible
to legislatively propose a single just sentence for all persons convicted of a particular crime and variations in
sentencing necessarily result from taking into account individual differences in each case. Furthermore, mandated sentences fail to consider the problem of jury
nullification, or the practical considerations of plea bargaining, backlog, problems of proof, prior relationship
between victim and defendant, and reluctance of victims
to prosecute.
No legal system can function without the exercise of
discretion. To eliminate discretion from the courts
where it is visible, is to reconstitute it in the police and
22
prosecutors where it is invisible.'
Judge Scirica's words are well worth remembering in the
present haste to standardize sentences, and in the flurry to condemn sentencing judges as either too harsh or too lenient on particular criminals. The sentencing judge's exercise of discretion
has always been a matter of public record and is often subjected
to high public visibility through the news media. The checks on a
judge's discretion are not only those imposed by law and the
higher courts, but those which society exert collectively through
the judge's awareness that his decisions are open to public
scrutiny.
However, now consider the policeman walking the beat who
decides to excuse or ignore a petty crime on the street, or the
prosecutor who drops charges that he thinks are weak, or, more
commonly, due to a plea bargain, or perhaps for other reasons. If
these officers bring the accused into my court and he is convicted,
I have no way of avoiding the decision that must come: the sentence. If, however, the charges are dropped, or bartered down,
or never brought, I will not be criticized for my decision, and
more than likely no one will criticize them for theirs, because their
decision is not made in an open forum subject to procedural and
122. A. Scirica, Fact Sheet-Senate Bill 195, 2, 3 (Nov. 10, 1978), quoted in
Commonwealth v. Frazier, 347 Pa. Super. 69, 70, 500 A.2d 158, 161 (1985).
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substantive examination. Compared to the discretion of the sentencing judge, the discretion of the prosecutor is truly vast and
unreviewable. 123
Lest it be believed that I am not fond of prosecutors, or do
not share their aims, nothing could be further from the truth. I
have been one of their company, and they have always seen me as
ajudge who is "tough on crime," hence pro-prosecution. I heartily endorse the goals of the prosecutorial profession to protect
and defend society from the ravages of crime. My quibble with
prosecutors in this instance is not with their ends, but their
means. They, just like the defense attorneys on the opposing
side of the bar, come to court with an axe to grind. Notwithstanding the popular (and official) notion of the district attorney as an
officer who impartially pursues justice rather than convictions,
district attorneys are in court to win. I am not suggesting that
they bring bad cases to court; what I am suggesting is that in most
situations they are not appropriate officials to be making final decisions in criminal cases.
The appropriate official is the judge. The hallmark of the judiciary is impartiality. There are always two stories to every
crime, assuming a crime is proven, and the judge has those two
stories, each with its flaws and strong points, out of which to fashion a fitting sentence. A rape can be a brutal crime of impersonal
violence, or the painful result of a relationship gone sour. 2 4 A
theft might owe to simple avarice, or dire poverty. A killer can be
a wanton and depraved individual thoroughly unfit to live in society, or simply out of control and full of remorse when the deed is
done. The prosecutor faced with these conflicting situations
would exercise discretion accordingly, but the sentencing judge,
steeped in the rule of law and the tradition of impartiality, should
determine the defendant's fate.
123. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 310, 495 A.2d 928, 935
(1985) (district attorney has unrestricted discretion whether or not to submit
case to accelerated rehabilitative disposition, absent some criteria for admission
to program wholly unrelated to society's protection or offender's rehabilitation,
such as race or religion) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 304 Pa. Super. 297,
450 A.2d 689 (1982) (Cirillo, J.) (private complainant has no standing to appeal
where district attorney decides to terminate prosecution of criminal action).
124. The supreme court recently defined the "forcible compulsion" necessary to establish rape as "not only physical force or violence but also moral,
psychological or intellectual force used to compel a person to engage in sexual
intercourse against that person's will." Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537,
555, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (1986). Rape is a crime of offense gravity score nine
with a mitigated minimum sentencing range with no prior record of 27 to 36
months. See 204 PA. CODE § 303.9(b).
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Devices like the mandatory sentencing acts and even the
guidelines remove judicial discretion, but it does not disappear.
It goes over to the prosecutor, who might have gained an edge on
the defendant by being able to bargain with a reduction in penalty
that the judge can no longer offer, or, if he still retains some discretion, is very limited in his exercise of it. The prosecutor has
always played a prominent role in our criminal justice system, but
with the guidelines and the mandatory minimums in place, he
threatens to eclipse the judge as its most powerful actor. The
result is not all bad-sentencing disparity will be reduced. But
discretion will be shifted to where it is unseen.
I have not imposed a sentence under either the mandatory
acts or the guidelines that form the topic for this paper, having
come to the superior court just before they became effective. I
have reviewed guidelines determinations on appeal, however, and
I am qualified to say it is not a satisfying type of appellate review.
Making sure that the trial judge has correctly placed the defendant in a box on a grid does little to convince me the sentence was
arrived at after careful consideration of crime and offender. I am
not sure what would have convinced me in a recent case, Commonwealth v. Ruffo,' 2 5 in which our court vacated a sentence totalling
twenty to forty years on a defendant who had kidnapped, brutality
assaulted, and horribly slashed a two-year-old girl for no better
reason than that she had interrupted his attempted burglary of
her home. In an opinion in which I joined, our court said the trial
court had erred in going beyond the guidelines' suggested ranges
based solely on the seriousness of the offense. Possibly, the judge
in Ruffo overreacted to the heinousness of the crime, and the sentence would have been vacated even without the guidelines. I
sincerely hope, however, that any sentence eventually imposed on
that defendant has some rehabilitative effect to make up for the
retributive motivation which our court held insufficient. 12 6 I have
no doubt that the sentences which I imposed on Walter Hill and
his co-defendant fifteen years ago, each totalling twenty-three and
one-half to forty-seven years in prison, would not have survived a
minute of scrutiny under today's guidelines. As it was, the superior court affirmed Hill's sentence after a slight modification of
125. No. 1419 Philadelphia 1986 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1987) (LEXIS, Pa
library, Super file).
126. Cf Commonwealth v. Whitney, 512 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Pa. 1986) (plurality opinion) (society's interest in retribution a legitimate factor supporting the
death penalty). But for a twist of fate, the defendant in Ruffo might have been
facing the death penalty.
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one to two years on merger grounds, but vacated his co-defendant's and remanded for resentencing because of the disparity between their criminal records. 127 In Commonwealth v. Hill, I had
thought the only solution to these repeat offenders' ravaging society was to, in effect, put them away. While the guidelines and
mandatory acts stand for a tough new attitude on crime, the
thought of a sentence of twenty years' actual time is sobering,
even upon my own reflection on this case.
The job of the sentencing jurist is without a doubt underappreciated, both in its complexities and in its mental turmoil for
the judge. The goals of rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence,
and incapacitation compete and coexist. Whatever choice the
judge makes, he risks incurring the displeasure of some interest
group or individual. The current climate of opinion reflects a
definite "get-tough" outlook on crime, and for good reason: the
streets of major cities and even small towns are being wracked
with a violent and tumultuous crime epidemic the likes of which
civilized society probably hasn't witnessed since the age of the
Vandals. The only effective way known to deal with most hardened criminals is to lock them away from the law-abiding public
for substantial prison terms. Any judge who dares exhibit lenity
in the face of today's crime wave risks public outrage and censure
as a criminal sympathizer. On the other hand, the seemingly random harshness sometimes doled out to individual offenders could
lead the media-consuming public to conclude that the criminal
justice system is essentially irrational in its operation.
Another conflict arises between the undervalued right of the
victim of crime to expect that the offender be isolated in an institution, and society's pressing need to come to grips with the
problem of burgeoning prisons. Warehousing criminals is the apparently easy solution to crime, but "rehabilitating" them in
prison is a largely failed experiment in this country, either because the material is lacking or the setting completely inconducive. Prisons cannot help most offenders who have gone far
enough to reach their portals. In fact, the opposite of rehabilitation more accurately reflects what goes on in a prison; in most
cases a sentence of any considerable length will commit the convict to a life of crime upon his release, because in prison he has
learned to live by its laws, and they are not the laws of polite
society.
127. Commonwealth v. Hill, 237 Pa. Super. 543, 353 A.2d 870 (1975), appeal denied, 237 Pa. Super. xxvi, 353 A.2d 870 (Pa. 1976); see also supra note 38.
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Are mandatory sentencing acts and guidelines that increase
punishment the answer? They address a symptom, but not the
causes, of crime. Moreover, the potential for unfairness in such
legislation is one good reason for approaching it with caution.
Legislators, judges, and law professors have all contributed examples of how Pennsylvania's mandatory sentencing acts might act
unfairly.' 28 District attorneys, on the other hand, uniformly applaud them.' 2 9 I will exercise my judicial discretion not to commit myself until the verdict is in. I must admit, however, to seeing
the utility of an act which announces to the armed felons who are
terrorizing our communities that there is no mercy and they
should expect none. Nor do I resent the sentencing guidelines
now in place. After overcoming my initial leeriness of them, I
have grudgingly come to accept that they provide sufficient range
for the prudent exercise of sentencing discretion. What I fear,
however, is that the legislature will see any success of the guidelines in meeting their objectives as a legitimate reason for curtailing the range of sentencing discretion even further, to the
point where the sentencing decision is nothing but a perfunctory
response to an outside command, and the judge can no longer
effect individual justice. The wisdom of our legislators, I think,
will warn them against letting that day arrive, and sentencing the
individual will continue to be the predominant way by which
sentences are determined in Pennsylvania.
V.

CONCLUSION

The overarching purpose of the Pennsylvania Sentencing
Guidelines is the laudable one of bringing rationality and predictability to the sentencing process. However, in striving to reach
128. See 1976 Pa. House Legislative Journal 6012-13 (statement of Rep.
LaMarca) (posing example of love relationship gone bad leading to rape charge;
speaking in opposition to mandatory minimum five-year sentence for rape);
Schaffner, Mandatory Sentencing-An Assessment, 58 PA. B.AJ. 26, 29 (1987) (posing disparity in sentencing between robbers robbing taxicabs serving different
locations-robbing taxi serving public transportation facility subjects defendant
to mandatory minimum five-year term); Dowd, supra note 5, at 16-17 (posing
hypothetical where Farmer Brown is subject to mandatory penalty for shooing
intruder off land with gun).
129. See Preate & Suss, Mandatory Sentencing-A Different Perspective, 58 PA.
B.AJ. 32 (1987). The prosecutors quote with favor ajudge who voices the opinion that the sentencing guidelines are too lenient with respect to the crime of
selling heroin. See id. at 36 & n.22. The guidelines address the judge's concern
in § 303.1 (e): "The Commission recognizes the difficulties in setting sentences
in certain cases. These include but are not limited to major drug trafficking ....
These crimes may warrant a sentence more severe than otherwise suggested in
this chapter." 204 PA. CODE § 303.1(e).
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this goal, we should be careful not to eliminate the human element from sentencing, or we will have surrendered one of the
most vital functions of the justice system to an inflexible, mechanical form of decision-making. We may have equality, but it will be
an arbitrary equality. A judge is not a sentencing machine, nor is
a criminal defendant a standard entity whose character and conduct can be judged solely by comparison with other cases or the
lines on a chart.
A non-judicial commission is not capable of sitting independently of any actual case and prescribing a correct presumptive
sentence applicable to all offenders convicted of a class of crimes.
It is not only mandatory sentences that "do not work" in all cases;
it is any predetermined sentence that robs the sentencing jurist of
sufficient discretion to deal with the facts and circumstances
presented by the conjunction of the individual before him and the
crime that he has committed.
The Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, by retaining sufficient "windows" for judicial discretion where they are needed,
strike a balance between the standardization and the individualization that are required in a rational sentencing scheme.
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